




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THE PROBLEM OF A RATIONAL GOOD

by

Delbert Raymond Gish
(A.B., Bethany-Peniel College, 1932;
M.A., Oklahoma University, 1934)

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Approved

by

First Reader *Edgar S. Brightman*

Professor of

Philosophy

Second Reader *L. Harold De Wolf*

Professor of

Philosophy

THE PROBLEM OF A RATIONAL GOOD

Outline

Chapter	Page
I. THE PROBLEM	1
1. Statement of the problem	1
2. The definition of 'rational'	4
i. Rationality and probability	8
ii. Methods and techniques <u>versus</u> ends	9
1). The scientific method	11
2). Method in philosophy	13
iii. A working definition of rationality	16
3. The definition of 'good'	17
i. Good <u>versus</u> value and ideal	17
ii. Fundamental assumptions concerned with the good	20
iii. The claim of good upon rational beings	24
iv. A working definition of the good	26
v. Validation of the definition	26
4. Summary of the chapter	29
5. Sources	31
6. Statement on method and the plan of future chapters	31
II. OPPOSITION TO THE RATIONAL GOOD	33
1. Review of the definition of the rational good	33
2. The incompleteness of the progress of mind	33

Chapter

Page

3. Classifications of various metaphysical views which fall into irrationality	34
i. First view: mechanism and atomism	36
ii. The second view: authoritarianism	38
iii. The third view: pessimism and fictionalism	40
iv. The fourth view: transvaluation	43
v. The fifth view: mysticism	48
vi. The sixth view: realism or factualism	51
4. Epistemological views which make concessions to the irrational	56
i. Irrational sources of belief	57
ii. The repudiation of reason, scepticism	62
iii. Epistemological dualism	66
iv. The will to believe: voluntarism	70
v. Intuitionism and mysticism	73
5. Summary of the chapter	76
III. THE RATIONAL AND THE GOOD	79
1. The suspicion of conflict between logic and reality	79
2. The conviction of connection between rationality and goodness	80
i. Plato	81
ii. Urban	82
iii. Kant	82

Chapter	Page
3. Intuition, reason, and the good	85
4. Results of the comparison of intuition and reason for the good	95
5. Summary of the chapter	99
IV. THE RATIONAL GOOD AND THE REAL	100
1. Reality defined	100
2. Modernist and traditional views of the problem	101
3. Intrinsic and instrumental goods	103
4. Values and goods on the practical plane are instrumental	104
5. Values and goods on the theoretical plane .	106
6. Arguments for the objective reality of good	107
i. Urban	107
ii. Köhler	107
iii. Alexander	108
iv. Pringle-Pattison	108
v. Other arguments	109
vi. Plato	111
vii. Lotze	111
viii. Bowne	112
ix. Leighton	112
x. Gilson	113

Chapter	Page
xi. Results of the arguments	114
7. The meaning and place of evil	115
8. Summary of the preceding section	118
9. The mode of the objective existence of good	119
i. Good is not a hypostatized abstraction	120
ii. Good exists concretely in personality .	120
10. The good and God	124
11. God's nature and relation to the world . .	126
12. The outcome of the view of God as personal for the rational good	135
13. Summary of the chapter	139
V. THE RATIONAL GOOD AND SOCIAL PROGRESS	142
1. Definitions and viewpoints	142
2. Principles of social progress	145
3. Views of the prospects of social progress	149
i. Kant.	149
ii. Otto and Santayana	150
iii. Dewey	150
iv. Plato	150
4. Views of the good to be gained and criticisms	151
5. The problem of social control	157

Chapter	Page
i. Contrast of totalitarianism and democracy	159
ii. National socialism	160
iii. Estimate of the principles of democracy	165
6. Modes of achieving rational democratic ends	169
i. Ways of securing co-operation	170
ii. Special value of rational persuasion.	171
iii. Training in value-appreciation.	172
7. Summary of the chapter	173
8. Some final thoughts	175
BIBLIOGRAPHY	179
ABSTRACT	193

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

1. Statement of the problem

This dissertation is an attempt to find out whether the good is defined and established altogether by reason, whether the good is partly rational on the one hand and partly nonrational, intuitive, emotional, traditional, or empirical on the other; or whether it is wholly determined by nonrational factors with reason serving merely as an instrument in its realization. Plato and Kant are important advocates of the first view; the philosophic tradition has been more generally in the spirit of the second; and various aspects of the third are being strongly urged in many quarters today, although it has never lacked supporters.

In the course of the investigation, answers to such questions as the following will also be sought: In what form is the good observed or experienced? What are the logical, epistemological, metaphysical and social strands of the good which need to be explored? Does the good possess any permanent, self-consistent character? What relation does good have to the external world beyond finite minds?

In spite of the constant repetition of the term "good" in the languages and literatures of mankind, there is a notorious disagreement about ultimate goods; and particularly is there disagreement about whether goods are in any

sense rational. If such a good is possible, then it needs to be brought to clear expression; for in spite of the enlightenment of modern nations, their disunity and lack of orientation toward a common goal speaks of anything but rationality.

Skepticism and indecision about ends characterize both nations and individual persons. Wilbur M. Urban describes the present time as one when "strange contradiction pervades our entire modern culture. . . ,"¹ and says that "the implicit assumption of the meaning, significance and value of our civilization. . . is being questioned on all sides."² In the same mood Blanshard finds that "self-will and the repudiation of a common standard of judgement and obligation threaten to extinguish the life of reason altogether."³ Wolfgang Köhler notes the tendency of educated and professional men to avoid problems of value, and to disclaim any responsibility for making "frames of reference," i.e. standards or ideals of worth. Because of this, there is a lack of convictions, of "stable mental orientation" to help people stand the strain and stress of trouble. He believes that science must bear its share of responsibility--all learning and research tend to resist the "orientation

1. Urban, IW, 172. (All symbols in bibliography).

2. Ibid., 131.

3. Blanshard, NT, II, 520.

that existed before the era of science." Science has helped destroy the stabilizing ideals, but apparently has no power to replace them.⁴

It would be unfair to lay the blame for the present confusion about good wholly at the doors of science, but considering its bias for description as opposed to evaluation, and its attempt to eliminate the personal factor as far as possible, it must bear a considerable part of the responsibility. With science as such, there is no problem of a rational good,--in fact, no problem of a good at all, for strictly speaking it recognizes none, or at best describes beliefs in good as facts, without regard to their validity. Typical scientific training evades personal evaluations as far as possible along with moral and ethical entanglements. The remarkable achievements of the sciences have given them tremendous influence, and during the last century the dogmatic confidence that science was a panacea for human ills was created. Most scientists had little inclination to discourage this feeling. However, the disillusionment has begun,⁵ and the wiser scientists now see that science must be contented to be a part and not the whole of human knowledge. Good and values contain obstinate elements that will not yield to the purely descriptive methods of science, but which still persist as facts in human experience.

4. Kohler, PVWF, 7, 11.

5. See Flewelling, art.(1926), 81-86.

Among reasons why the rational good becomes a problem these may be noted: First, as just mentioned, science is a marvel of the modern age which has had its success independently (apparently) of the concept of any good at all, except the assumed good of science. Second, there is no general and clear idea of what a rational good means, what it should require of a society or nation. Third, there is no guarantee that a rational good is possible. Finally, it has not been made an actuality, except in an unsatisfactory manner in isolated societies, and much of the gain has been lost.

Under such circumstances, one might ask, why should there be any search for a good that is determined by reason? Why not be content with the intuitive way, the "instincts of the blood," the drives that underlie the whole complex mental and physical organization of individual persons? Why not let the good be determined by force, authority, chance, or its subjective marks? Simply because it is possible that the discipline and direction of reason can bring more benefits to more people than can any other means. If a rational good is possible, it should be explored. But in order to produce a rational good, it seems probable that something more than rational exploration is required.

2. The definition of rational

Although the terms "good" and "rational" are familiar and frequently used, they require constant redefinition in

order to acquire for them and preserve a basic, sharply delineated meaning. There are are certain loopholes in the conception of rationality; it is ambiguous, said Hastings Rashdall,⁶ for

It may mean 'intelligible' or 'reducible to a coherent system such that one part of it could (with adequate insight) be inferred from another.' In this sense the Universe might be rational if it were a sort of infernal machine. Or it may mean (and that is the only sense in which we ought to talk about a reality which includes events as 'rational') realizing an end which is absolutely good. It has been part of the legerdemain of a certain school to prove that the Universe is rational in the first sense, and then to assume that it must be rational in the second, and therefore, it is urged, anything in it which strikes us as bad must be mere appearance.

Rashdall's analysis deals with rationality at a rather high level. At lower less complex levels of explanation, where immediate practical purposes (e.g. communication), are involved, customary action and ordinary sanity pass for rationality. If an idea conveys any intelligible meaning, it is in some sense rational. However, the term "rational" has different meanings on the practical level of necessary communication between persons, on the scientific level of precise description and causal explanation (including the psychiatric),⁷ and on the philosophical level of explanation by teleology, synopsis, and system-building. There is of course no absolute demarcation between these levels concerning the

6. Rashdall, TGE, II, 219, footnote.

7. See Allport, PER, Chap. XIV, 369-399.

meaning of rational, but on the whole the following distinctions will obtain.

On the level of necessary intercommunication rational means whatever is not purely subjective or arbitrary;⁸ the clear, simple, related, or conceivable;⁹ the moderate, temperate, nonextreme;¹⁰ what is expressible in the language which is in general use; what is expressible in finite (mathematical) terms; whatever is sensible, enlightened, discreet,¹¹ intelligent, sane, sound; the intelligible, comprehensible,¹² or understandable; and anything which has the power to satisfy the intellect.

On the scientific level where description, the concept of mechanical cause, and analysis are extensively used, rational means completely objective and impersonal;¹³ factual rather than speculative, with quantities expressed in exact mathematical rather than approximate figures; whatever is least complex and least involved, i.e. as simple as possible; expressible in terms of causal antecedents and consequents; experimentally verifiable;¹⁴ predictable;¹⁵ and in

8. Pratt, RC, 333.

14. Ayer, LTL, 180-181.

9. Santayana, LOR, 243.

15. Reichenbach, EAP, 145, 192, 404.

10. Spinoza, ETH, IV, lxi, 183.

11. Century Dictionary, VI.

12. Blanshard, NT, II, 449.

13. Köhler, PVWF, 36.

general, rational means for science whatever is fruitful or promising, as exemplified in ideas or procedures, hypotheses or methods which yield immediate results.

On the philosophic level rational means interconnected, unified, linked significantly with other objects or ideas;¹⁶ systematic, grounded upon a substantial supporting concept;¹⁷ concrete, organically related, harmonious; conceptual in character, following largely from deduction, and less from perception and induction; interpretative rather than descriptive; and partaking of coherence, self-consistency, ever-increasing inclusiveness, and the best possible end.¹⁸

The difference between reasonable and rational should not be overlooked. A rational plan which effectively connects end and means may be unreasonable in its demands. A person who is unreasonable (e.g. a convalescent) may be in full possession of his mental powers.¹⁹ But to reiterate what was said above: the distinctions will not always be clear-cut; they are intended chiefly to show that there are grounds for scientists to call philosophers irrational, and the reverse; and for both to declare irrational an idea which might satisfy a man of less reflective temperament.

16. Hobhouse, RG, 62-64; Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 239, 260.

17. Bowne, MET(rev.), 328; Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 65.

18. Brightman, presidential address at National Association of Biblical Instructors, Cambridge, Mass. See also Brightman, art.(1941), 393-414.

19. See Kolnai, WAW, 57.

i. Rationality and probability. Both truth and probability may be called rational ideas. Truth is an end in whose direction both rationality and probability aim; but while probability is at its highest reach when it closely approximates truth, rationality seeks also other ends which are conceived as valuable--for example, the good and the beautiful--and in its highest reaches it partakes fully of their nature. Thus probability and rationality may be said to become fellow-travelers on the path toward truth. They progress together; as a result it turns out that the most probable account of an event is also the most rational. Both rationality and probability depend upon the relation of propositions which are candidates for belief to the evidence upon which they are grounded. The mental task of testing beliefs for probability and for rationality is never fully completed, but as its results are achieved a person's whole system of knowledge and belief is raised to constantly higher levels of comprehensiveness, clarity, harmony, and objectivity.

The task is never done. Even at the higher levels where system-building brings more and more particulars into intelligible unity, one system-maker may arrive at a synoptic view of things which seems to him to solve the metaphysical paradoxes of all time; but another system-builder, viewing the same phenomena from another position, finds the solution as puzzling as the problems. It is with this situation

in mind that Urban writes the following words:²⁰

Among philosophers the lack of a common idiom is notorious. Naturalistically minded philosophers find Hegel unintelligible; and it is no less the case that propositions, which to positivism and naturalism seem to have meaning, are for critical philosophers little less than nonsense.

It may well be that the first step toward rationality is a look at the ways in which men believe it is to be produced.

ii. Methods and techniques versus ends. The intelligibility of any point of view is largely a function of the method by which that point of view is reached. In the last analysis, one's ideal of rationality may be attained only if he employs a method which can satisfy that ideal, and which will not contradict the ideal. No absolute methods are known. Philosophers disagree, for example, on whether the explanation of parts by reference to wholes or the reverse is more intelligible. But to be logical, which is the minimum demand of the rational mind, one must adopt a mode of procedure and follow it through. There is, says Bowne,²¹

need of a critical procedure which shall help the mind to self-knowledge, define and clarify its aims, secure consistency in the development of its practical postulates, and adjust their mutual relations. This is the field of logic; and in this work of development, adjustment, and rectification logic has its inalienable rights and a function of supreme importance.

Yet the differences of opinion about procedures lead to many an impasse. Some philosophers advocate the selection of ends without any criticism of means other than to

20. Urban, IW, 187, 188(quoted from latter page).

21. Bowne, TTK, 383.

note their chances for immediate success or failure. It is irrational from this point of view, to court failure by reason of scruples which prohibit the use of the shortest and most effective methods possible. Yet other philosophers seem to say that little attention to ends is necessary if only self-consistent means are used. The differences reduce to the question of the remoteness or the immediacy of the ends considered, and of the emphasis which is to be given the one or the other. The scientific ideal is characterized by an emphasis on method. It is in this spirit of confidence in method that Ayer insists upon its primary rôle.²²

For to be rational is simply to employ a self-consistent accredited procedure in the formation of all one's beliefs. . . . We define a rational belief as one which is arrived at by the methods which we now consider reliable. There is no absolute standard of rationality. . . . We trust the methods of contemporary science because they have been successful in practice. If in the future we were to adopt different methods, then beliefs which are now rational might become irrational from the standpoint of these new methods.

Huxley and Rader make a plea for a balance between the selection of ends and the employment of techniques. The former declares that the ideal of charity must govern men of all ranks, for otherwise "technological progress has merely provided us with more efficient means for going backwards."²³ Ends must not be selected without any attention to means, for "the means employed determine the nature of the ends produced."²⁴ Rader also takes a view which calls for rational

22. Ayer, LTL, 144-145.

24. Huxley, EAM, 10.

23. Huxley, EAM, 9.

means and a rational criticism of ends. His idea is that²⁵

A science of means, without a critique of ends, does not make life rational. If there is no way of determining whether our purposes are reasonable, there can be no way of judging whether the means are rightly employed. Every technique may be adapted to a variety of ends. . . . Clearly, we shall be none the better for all our technical knowledge unless we have something more--knowledge of the good.

Differences in human temperaments are largely responsible for varied emphases on means and ends. It seems to be part of the fundamental nature of some persons to think analytically, and to view things atomistically. Theirs is a scientific turn of mind, and they will ordinarily be perfectors of techniques rather than criticizers of ends. Other persons naturally think synoptically, view things more readily as organic wholes, and exhibit a philosophic temperament. What one type of person may regard as an intelligible approach to the world and its secrets often seems futile and senseless to the other. Is there no help for this difficulty? At least one will be suggested after a further short examination of the difficulty itself.

1). The scientific method. Required by the scientific method are the following assumptions or procedures:

- (1) Exclusion of the concepts of value and purpose.
- (2) A thoroughly objective approach; the experimenter to be as inconspicuous as possible, free of bias and partiality.²⁶

25. Rader, NC, 53-54.

26. Köhler, PVWF, 36.

- (3) Results must be verifiable, and only the successful outcome or fruitfulness of a method justifies it; it should give rise to successful predictions.²⁷
- (4) The use of mathematical and quantitative measurements is fundamental.
- (5) Terms, categories, and definitions should be standardized as far as possible.²⁸
- (6) Observance of the principle of parsimony is essential.
- (7) Exact observation and discovery rather than demonstration is the goal of science.²⁹
- (8) Analysis is the chief instrument to be used, and usually takes precedence over synthesis.
- (9) Sensory, perceptual knowledge is, as a rule, more trustworthy than conceptual knowledge, and induction more valuable than deduction. (Many exceptions to this should be granted).

Modern science has had success enough to make it tremendously important; through its labors the physical world has been made more the servant than the master of man. Yet nothing is more certain, a fact recognized by scientists

27. Ayer, LTL, 180-181.

28. Köhler, PVWF, 36.

29. Dewey, EN, 152.

themselves, than that something is wrong with the way the whole matter has worked out. There is a paradox in it; the results which have the greatest potentiality for human good often are employed most diligently to the destruction of the things which humanity ought to prize.

2). Method in philosophy. A somewhat wider range of starting points is possible for philosophical study than for scientific (restricted as it is by its subject matter). In philosophical investigation one may begin with the self (as will, mind, or consciousness) and introspection; with the objective world (assuming it to be fundamentally either matter, will, or mind-stuff); or with God and the realm of ideals, goods, and religious values. Otherwise philosophy will use every method which science uses, the main difference being that philosophy will attempt to create a system as inclusive as possible, to get a whole view, while science is necessarily restrictive. There was a time when little distinction existed between philosophical and scientific methods. Both traveled the 'high priori road'³⁰ of deduction from ultimate propositions. Science has now deserted this pathway, while philosophy on occasion uses both inductive and deductive methods, both experience and reason, much more readily than does science.

No method is final except the method which makes the individual mind superior to all modes of procedure. This is the basis for the removal of the impasse between those who

30. Ayer, LTL, 62; used by Blanshard, NT, II, 403.

are scientifically inclined and those who are imbued with the spirit of philosophy. Often enough a useful way of attacking a problem becomes "a method, then a habit, and finally a tyranny that defeats the end it was used for."³¹ None of the various aspects of the world can be made intelligible throughout by a single method, except the method of giving the active mind free rein. It is of course true, as Brightman indicates,³² that

sense-experience lends itself more readily to the methods of atomistic logic, while values, being true wholes, can be understood only by what we have called organic logic.

However, as he would be the first to insist, neither atomistic nor organic logic without the active mind can bring understanding.

Ultimately one must see that method is important as an aid to the working mind, but that it is not the final guarantee of success in striving for the rational good.

"There is no simple and compendious standard which will give the truth by mechanical application. The living mind dealing with the concrete facts is the only standard."³³ "Atomism is rational, we see, only to the extent to which it satisfies the demand of the mind for that which remains identi-

31. James, APU, 219.

32. Brightman, IPI, 30.

33. Bowne, TTK, 385.

cal without changing" ³⁴ The older view (a rather extreme teleology) is also but a partial one: ³⁵

There is plainly much in human experience that can be brought under the idea of the good, in the sense of being taken as means to a special and limited end. But sooner or later the attempt to work this scheme over the whole field of experience breaks down, and to persist in it is fanaticism.

Irrationality develops in the exclusive use of one method or another. In the appropriate circumstances, which the individual person must decide upon, the "part-working" of the mind may be most effective, and in other circumstances the "whole-working". ³⁶ The search for rationality cannot rest in methods--in fact, it cannot rest at all. The work of the mind is never done. ³⁷

Behind all methods, then, is actual thought, living thought, the rational operation of the whole mind. Methods should have the same importance as workmen's tools, no more. No saw is so important as the carpenter, for it is not so relevant to a wide variety of situations as he. It has a limited use. In the same way methods have limited uses, and important truth should not be required to stand or fall with methods. For many pursuits (e.g. childtraining) a lively ingenuity which uses or discards any and all established

34. Russell, art.(1922), 511-512.

35. Blanshard, NT, II, 441.

36. Terms used by Rufus Jones in Bennett, SOM, xi, Introduction.

37. Hobhouse, RG, 73, 75.

methods according to the end that is aimed at is indispensable. In such cases the adherence to a single method would fall to the inefficient level of "using a square peg in a round hole." Rationality requires a sense of the fitness of things.

Explanation and intelligibility suffer from the inadequacies of language and the aberrations of the mental powers. The highest level of rationality that can be attained by finite minds, while worth the effort, is short of the degree of perfection that is to be desired; but at the same time that they fall short of the full perfection, individual minds do make encouraging and necessary progress. It is hard work to be rational, but disastrous not to try to be. "Reason comes by her own. . . because unreason carried far enough produces miseries and disasters."³⁸

iii. A working definition of rationality. Henceforth, rationality as intended in these pages will be used to designate the goal of a dialectic which in the Socratic manner leaves no important idea undefined, and in the manner of Hegel attempts to include all facts in the explanatory scheme. It will emphasize neither analysis nor synthesis to the exclusion of one or the other; nor will it ignore the place of feeling and intuition as it explores reason. Rationality is an achievement of the whole man,

38. Hobhouse, RG, 121.

not of reason only. In no case will the abdication of reason in a sceptical or agnostic mood be regarded as rational. Rationality will be thought of as having some immediate and some more ultimate characteristics which differ and which must be combined in order to attain the highest practical level of self-consistency possible. In this combination of the present and partial knowledge of things with an ideal of reason, there is the first intimation of the rational good--a good which consists first of all in the clarity and coherence and truth of thought itself, and afterwards in man's realization of its benefits in his environment. Above all, at its higher levels, rationality will be thought of as a movement toward a wider inclusion of facts of experience, and this continually expanding horizon constitutes an ideal aim. To show that a moral act is rational is to connect it with a rational end or aim.³⁹

3. The definition of good

1. Good versus value and ideal. In order to define good it is helpful and necessary to distinguish it from two other closely related concepts, namely value and ideal. Human experience is complex; within it can be differentiated the notions of the actually liked and the ought-to-be-liked. Whatever is actually liked or arouses interest may be said to be or to have a value.⁴⁰ The assertion that anything is

39. Hobhouse, RG, 77.

40. See Brightman, ITP, 126; Hobhouse, RG, 66.

good is a value-claim.⁴¹ Value-claims may refer to true values, i.e. genuine, objective goods; or they may be merely subjective, arbitrary, and irrational. Human beings attribute value to numerous sensations, emotions, ideas, and feelings which they experience; but further experience and the processes of reason bring them to the point of denying real and lasting worth to many immediately pleasurable conscious states. Value-claims are usually the expressions of original impulses; a man likes in the sheer immediacy of liking before he likes for a more valid reason. However, as a man comes to be ruled more and more by reason, his value-claims are based increasingly upon what he sees ought to be liked, rather than upon physiological drives or uncriticized emotional states. Thus a value-claim may become a true value.

In this dissertation, good is the term which will be used whenever a true value is meant. It will refer to any event or fact which makes a valid demand upon rational persons for recognition. Whatever ought to be liked will be called good. That there is such an aspect of reality is an assumption without which any further discussion is blocked. It cannot be proved by anything other than an appeal to rational experience. If a man says "that is good", he means to assert a characteristic of something in his en-

41. See Brightman, RV, 15, et passim; also POR, 91-92, 114-116, 206.

vironment. Cases often occur in which a man makes this judgment under logical and ethical compulsion. Even though the consequences are unpleasant to him, the perception that a new order of things increases benefits to a great many other people makes the judgment of value the necessary reaction to it, called for by its objective validity. It compels respect because men are in some measure ethical and logical beings. They see in this order characteristics which they cannot deny and at the same time retain their integrity; they feel the obligation to recognize it as good.

An ideal is any pattern or concept of a more perfect state of affairs than the idealizer has yet been able to make actual; or an ideal is a good end which makes a valid claim upon a person in so far as it is capable of being realized by him. In their original status ideals are not real in the sense of existing, but they are real in so far as they are valid for rational minds. As they represent a man's utmost capacity to achieve perfection they are true values or goods. One is not obligated to love an ideal which cannot be realized at all, but the love of valid ideals makes what would otherwise be merely change in the world a genuine progress. Ideals are the counterpart of the capacity of persons to transcend the immediate by perceiving and desiring a remote good.⁴²

From the above discussion it will be seen that ra-

42. See Brightman, POI, Chap. III, 62-100.

tionality as defined in this dissertation includes the effect of ideals on individual minds, for it has been said that rationality aims at the good.

In spite of the contention of numerous philosophers that good and value are indefinable,⁴³ one may demur that when a person has a concept of anything he has an idea which can in some way, however inadequate, be expressed or defined. Thus one who has seen the color yellow may grope for words, but there are propositions about it which have meaning, according to the intelligence and previous experience of the person to whom the propositions are addressed. To regard any term as wholly indefinable seems to reduce a person to complete inability to say anything significant about it. Good and value may resist adequate definition, but some meaningful statements may be made about them. Some of these follow in the succeeding paragraph.

ii. Fundamental assumptions concerned with the good. Good will be better understood by examining the postulates presupposed by the supposition of a rational good. These are necessitated if good is to have any rational meaning, and must be seen as implied by the notion of rational good. The first postulate to be noted here is that a good with some degree of rationality must be real, i.e. it is not merely a matter of preference; it has some status in the

43. Moore, PE, 7; Urban, IW, 139-140; Rashdall, TGE, I, 135; Dewey, EN, 398; Sorley, MVIG, 91, 93, 108, 139, 141; Demos, POP, 74.

actual world. If there is no objective good, no benefit that man does not now possess could result from his action. To act at all would be both futile and foolish. A rational good is one that is objective. This idea will be explored rather fully in Chapter Four.

The second assumption is that good can be actualized. Freedom is essential to the good as it is essential to rationality.⁴⁴ For if there were good, and man could not realize it, this would be to cause him pain and misery, and thus would contradict the idea of good which motivates him. And if men believe that their choices make a difference in the world when they actually do not, then the system in which such a thing is possible is irrational. This will be treated more fully in Chapter Five.

The third assumption is that some goods are not yet realized in practical affairs. This is to say that ideals and duties are bound up with the notion of good. For it would be meaningless and irrational for creatures with the power of reason and the capacity for realizing values that human beings have, to carry on life in a world where nothing else good could ever be achieved. Human beings normally neither feel that there are no goods to be valued and realized, nor that life would be bearable unless goods could be realized. There are still persons who forego places of prestige and opportunity with high salaries because they

44. Bowne, MET, 329.

cannot feel that they deserve the amount paid. They have an ideal of actualizing a proportionate amount of good for the remuneration they receive. This general question, also will be more fully dealt with in Chapter Five.

Fourth is the assumption of the enduring quality or the permanence of goods. It must simply be seen that if a supposed good does not last long enough to be tested and evaluated, if it does not remain valid everywhere it occurs, it loses its rational character, which is the chief quality which could require it to be regarded as good. This assumption, if true, makes possible the rational choice of alternatives with a view to the long run. Although human conceptions of good may be only partly stabilized or made permanent, the objective world-order still retains a systematic mode of operation in which everything that is good makes a lasting contribution. Chapter Four will deal with this postulate at greater length.

The fifth assumption is that the concept of the good which each person has is binding upon him, and also is to be taken as indicative of the general nature of good everywhere in the universe. This is expressed in Brightman's Law of Autonomy (derived from Kant), that "self-imposed ideals are imperative."⁴⁵ If the first proposition is not true, then we are being deceived about good and no rational ideal

45. Brightman, ML, 106; See Rashdall, TGE, I, 61.

is possible. If the Law of Autonomy is untrue, then no further progress in understanding the nature of the good can be made, for a man's own mental capacity is the first and last means by which he can know anything. The good becomes an "ought-to-do", a fact binding upon the man who comprehends it; and increasingly so in proportion to its degree of coherence with the rest of his thinking. Chapters Four and Five will both employ this assumption and give it further explication.

The sixth postulate concerning the rational good is concerned with its requirement that all persons should be regarded as equal so far as the primary fact of selfhood alone is considered. Good is realized in persons; only persons recognize the ought--the obligation which the perception of an ideal places upon them. Rationality permits no unfairness among persons, and a rational good is impossible if some persons have unearned and unmerited advantages. Basic equality of persons, then, is a postulate of the rational good; if there is inequality it must be such as can be rationally justified--an equality which in the final analysis is really adjusted reward,⁴⁶ deserved, and coherent in the whole social scheme. In Chapter Five this postulate will be considered still further.

The ought-to-be-liked, the good, will be the goal when one values rationally, i.e. with a coherent, self-consistent, and most widely inclusive end in view. The ought-

46. Cf. Wheelwright, CIE, 378.

to-be-liked takes precedence over the liked because it makes a universally comprehensible appeal; i.e. it has meaning for all rational minds, whereas value-claims are individual and often hotly contested opinions with doubtful validity when carried to wider areas of experience.

iii. The claim of good upon rational beings. The reasonable person is oriented by his own nature toward the ought-to-be-liked. As soon as a man begins to discipline his likes by referring them to reasons, he becomes more objective. His value-claims will either gain new strength thereby, or die for want of sustenance because they cannot assimilate the strong meat of rational objectivity with which adult ideas are nourished. One may differ with Plato concerning the mode of conceiving the objectivity of the good, but that the way of knowledge leads to the good seems undeniable. Plato expresses the idea thus:⁴⁷

The idea of good is the highest knowledge, . . . all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this.

.
Do you think that the possession of the whole world is of any value without the good? or of all wisdom, without the beautiful and good?

It has already been intimated that purpose is an aspect of rationality.⁴⁸ Purpose is basic in the nature of a reasonable person, a rational being. Coherent thought it-

47. Plato, Rep., Bk. vi, 505a.

48. See above, 15-17.

self is fraught with intention, with a motivation toward its object.⁴⁹ "At any moment," says Royce, "your ideas, in so far as they are rational, embody a purpose."⁵⁰ Purpose is the term applied to the will to approve, choose, and pursue an end persistently. A good purpose may be said to rule the person who approves, chooses, and persistently pursues ideal ends, those which ought to be pursued. "Reason calls us to see our minds and our world as a whole; and to approve as ideal only those ends which are rational in the light of that vision."⁵¹

Purposes come into conflict and contradict each other--a condition which indicates that the task of reason is not yet fully performed, and that the good is incompletely realized. A man who is at cross-purposes with himself cannot assert that his mental state is good, nor is he able with confidence to reason about what ought to be liked in a more ultimate sense. He is irrational in as much as he sees the good imperfectly. When one sees what ought to be liked and finds his satisfaction in it, he has, for the time being, realized his rational capacity to the full. Changing conditions, and the arrival of new ideas may later require him to look again, to select and pursue ends in the

49. Cf. Hobhouse, RG, 22.

50. Royce, WI, I, 441, 443.

51. Brightman, POI, 82.

service of the good, but each challenge thus met brings him a rung higher on the ladder of rationality.

The definition of good, as well as that of rationality, requires reference to purpose, the kind of purpose that is expressed in a rational will. "The coherent will alone is concretely good. It is the source of the goodness of objects or things."⁵² Until there is some sense of direction, of goal or end, no one can say with conviction that anything is good except the purpose or will which intends to move in such a direction that good will be produced, whatever that direction may turn out to be.

iv. A working definition of the good. If purposes are both rational in the sense defined above, and successful, a good objective order is the probable outcome. Whatever men find or whatever they experience is accepted by them as good if they see that it fulfils a rational purpose, i.e. a purpose which includes the greatest possible benefit to all together. Rational purposes and anything that fulfils rational purposes may be said to be good. Anything which has not been employed, is no longer employed, or cannot be employed to fulfil a rational purpose may be neutral or evil; the latter if it fulfils an irrational purpose.

v. Validation of the definition. This description of the good, although somewhat general, is clear. To be ra-

52. Paton, GW, 180.

tional as previously defined, includes being coherent, self-consistent, and the constant attempt to include more facts. Purpose refers to the persistent will to approve, choose, and pursue any end, good or bad. Rational purpose indicates the self-direction and self-restraint of the person actively seeking the things he likes and ought to like, voluntarily submitting to the principles of coherence, self-consistency, etc. The motivation, the will to make purposes rational, must come from childhood training, from an active conscience, or from a religious consciousness.

The definition places emphasis upon purposes, and thus indicates two functions of a purpose--the motivating of a person to choose ends and to select means. Since rational purposes themselves are basic agencies in the service of the good, without which it could have neither meaning nor realization, such purposes must be designated as intrinsic goods, or ends-in-themselves. The means which they employ are instrumental goods; the latter will be rational so far as they are harmonized with the end sought, examined and selected with the view of increasing the rationality of purposing agents everywhere. It is not intended to maintain that the only intrinsic goods are rational purposes,--any end, rationally chosen, may be said to be an intrinsic good. But it will be instrumental in so far as it contributes still further to the development of rational purposes or wills. Rational purposes will include the inten-

tion to like what is worth liking, and thus exclude values based merely on impulsive or erratic desires. One of the strange paradoxes of the human self is its ability to accomplish its aim to be rational by deciding against itself, choosing a rational end in spite of its strong inclination toward an irrational end.

Someone might object that purposes are often evil, so that the definition would allow whatever serves evil ends to be called good. An evil political machine, like the Nazi party, could be called good because it fulfils a purpose. The word rational is the sole safeguard against this interpretation. Whatever is evil is so because it conflicts with well-established, well-attested purposes. Evil is by nature ungrounded, detached, illogical, partial, spasmodic, and incoherent. Within a limited realm evil purposes may be elaborately and intricately organized, but their success must depend upon deception concerning their true place in the whole order of existence.

The attempts to define the good and the rational have shown how closely related the two concepts are. In experience they seem to be inseparable if one adheres closely to the idea of good as that which ought to be liked. In that case the rational is part of the good--it is one of the items which ought to be liked. On the other hand, if there is a genuine good, it will inevitably and invariably be found to be rational in the sense in which rational has

been defined. This problem is fundamental--it will occupy the most of Chapter Three.

4. Summary of the chapter

In the present chapter a statement of the problem and definitions of terms have been presented. The fact must be recognized that in spite of the constant use of the term good and the efforts of men to develop a rational society, the present state of things is disappointing. Modern science, which has been regarded as possibly the most rational of human interests, and which has its day of profound influence, has assumed an attitude of indifference toward the good. Therefore one is constrained to ask, first, in what sense, if any, is the good rational? Second, are there valid concepts of good which human reason can discover? Is a rational good either necessary or possible? Finally, can the supposedly valid concepts of good be realized in concrete experience?

Such questions can only be answered when it is known what is meant by the rational good. The ambiguity of the word rational is one of the stumblingblocks which must be removed. For this dissertation the meaning of the word was taken to be three things: First, the clarity and coherence of the thought-process itself; second, a dialectic whereby the end to which a constantly wider inclusion of data logically points is taken as making certain justifiable demands upon the reasoner; and third, the attempt to fulfil

these demands by applying them to nature and to society. Thus rationality may be thought of as a union of the ideal and the practical.⁵³

The good, it was said, requires differentiation from ideals and values. Whereas value refers to whatever is desired, liked, loved, enjoyed, or prized, the good is taken to refer only to what ought to be liked. Values are thus dependent upon persons and are subjective; true values are taken to be equivalent to the good and have also an objective aspect. As objective, the good makes a rational demand on minds everywhere--its appeal is universal. Ideals are goods which call upon rational beings to realize them; they are ends which ought to be liked because of their nature, and because of the nature of the rational persons who approve of them. Of course they are values, too, when someone likes them.

Good is of two orders or kinds--the good end, good-in-itself, and the good means, or instrumental good. The good-in-itself is defined in this chapter as a rational will or the intention of a rational mind. The first thing that can be said to be good is the agency which intends to move and does move in such a direction that good will be produced, increased, spread abroad. Instrumental good is the designation for anything which fulfils rational purposes.

53. See above, 16-17.

5. Sources

Among ancient philosophers, Plato and his successors up to the closing of the Academy furnish considerable relevant material. Germs of much modern thinking are present in the philosophy of the Sophists, the Cyrenaics, the Cynics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. In the modern period the material becomes so abundant as to be almost unwieldy. From the seventeenth century until the present in Germany, France, and England able men have contributed extensively to the better understanding of rationality and goodness. Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, the British moralists, the Deists, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, the German idealists--but time and space fail even the naming of the contributors. No attempt can be made to review all these sources, but wherever fitting and needful, they will be used for illustration and reference.

Recent books which relate closely to the problem of this dissertation are: The Rational Good by L.T. Hobhouse, The Good Will by H.J. Paton, and The Intelligible World by W.M. Urban. A glance at footnotes will reveal that much help has been derived from Bowne, Blanshard, Bosanquet, Brightman, Dewey, James, Leighton, Pringle-Pattison, Rader, Rashdall, and many others.

6. Statement on method and the plan of future chapters.

The method to be followed in the dissertation is to explore first the writings of certain philosophers who en-

ertain doubts about the rationality of the world, and who are somewhat arbitrary in their selection of ideals which they regard as valid. These writings and viewpoints will be subjected to criticism. With the help of the results obtained by criticism, with the method indicated, the problem of the implicative system in which the rational good plays its part will be explored. Throughout, the aim will be to realize the ideal of rationality already portrayed, and if this effort is successful, the final chapter will indicate what relation the rational good may be expected to bear to social progress, and will constitute an attempted application of the principles evolved to the social environment. The plan as a whole follows: Chapter One, as noted, states the problem and offers definitions. Chapter Two will deal with objections to the notion of a rational good. In Chapter Three certain logical and epistemological ramifications of the rational good will be explored; the problem of Chapter Four will be the relation of the rational good to the real; and as stated above, Chapter Five will be concerned with the possibility that a rational good may bear fruit in social progress.

With this prelude, then, the course is set, and the task is ready to begin. The first question to ask is, what case do those have who challenge the rational good? Can it be demonstrated to be an ideal alike impossible to conceive coherently and to realize? These questions require an answer which the following chapter will attempt to supply.

CHAPTER II

OPPOSITION TO THE RATIONAL GOOD

1. Review of the definition of the rational good

In the preceding chapter the rational good has been defined as having a dual aspect: the first and fundamental one is a will that moves coherently, consistently, and intelligently to produce and increase harmony; and the second aspect consists of the means which this will employs to produce harmony. The present chapter will set forth a number of views which oppose one or both of the elements of rationality as thus defined. These views will then be evaluated.

2. The incompleteness of the progress of mind

All philosophers worthy of the name have recognized one fact--namely that finite intelligence has proceeded but a small distance toward complete understanding of the world. Whether this results from the intrinsic irrationality (brute factuality) of nature, or from the limitations of finite reason, or from both together, is a point at issue. Comparatively few thinkers are persuaded that the world is meaningless, but it seems only fair to say that¹

The actual knowledge that we have arrived at in no way justifies us in assuming the absolute rationality of the universe. Strictly speaking, not a single event

1. Höffding, POR, 36-37.

has ever been entirely explained. Our causal series display many gaps, and they come to an end altogether long before we have reached any cause which we can suppose to be first.

Therefore reason is often at rope's end, and many system-builders charge the objective world, both physical and nonphysical, with the responsibility. Reason could discover its secret if it had a secret, and solve its problems if a solution were possible. Many world processes apparently neutralize each other and are therefore self-defeating. The world is in part irrational and there is no guarantee that a rational good is possible.²

3. Classifications of various metaphysical views which fall into irrationality

Various conceptions of the world's supposed irrationality have been formulated. To say, on metaphysical grounds, that the objective world partakes of unreason may mean

- (1) that it is mechanical in its operation, atomistic in its composition, and infiltrated with unaccountable (or brute) facts. This view is called mechanism, atomism, naturalism, or the scientific view. The names of Democritus, Hobbes, Hume, and Darwin may be associated with the idea of mechanism or atomism. Empiricism and realism in general are aspects of philosophy which take account of brute fact.

2. See Cohen, RN, 136, for an assertion that there is irrationality in the universe.

- (2) that it is governed by an arbitrary will or mind which is indifferent to human valuations and ideals. This view may be called authoritarianism and is exemplified in Calvinism and in Mohammedanism.
- (3) that the so-called goods which the world affords are subjective and illusory while seeming to be real; values are palliatives to keep human victims disposed to endure further suffering. There is no true good. This is called pessimism, and Schopenhauer is the most famous proponent of it.
- (4) that there are real or objective goods, but that these are contrary to usual human valuations; the usual valuations are irrational. This is approximately what Nietzsche affirms in what he calls transvaluation in the subtitle of The Will to Power.
- (5) that the real goods are inaccessible to the discursive reason, and hence incapable of definition and conceptual treatment. Plotinus is an outstanding representative of this view, which is called mysticism.
- (6) that the world contains an irrational element (not merely brute fact) which is intrinsically antagonistic to law and order, and which continuously resists the efforts of reason to overcome it. The

religions of the world recognize such an element as a rule; (Ahriman, Satan, karma). But it is also recognized by certain empirical philosophers, of whom Plato is an eminent representative. The view itself, for want of a better term, may be called realism or factualism.

i. First view: mechanism and atomism. Naturalism and the natural sciences contain views which approximate that expressed in the first group above. For the scientist the world is a maze of facts to be discovered and described in as orderly a fashion as possible.³

It is loosely knit. Its primary material are minute particles, and the main principle which science recognizes in their behavior is mere chance. . . . So much progress in our appreciation of the world could not be achieved in a few years. Galileo, for instance, was entirely unaware that nature is ruled by chance and thus escapes all understanding. It was practically our generation which made this final discovery.

Science employs one main explanatory principle--the mechanical principle of cause and effect. It must find the antecedents and the consequents of each single fact, and it makes no attempt to explain why any fact should be just what it is, beyond asserting that some event or chain of events immediately preceded it. One effect of this adherence to the scientific method is to rule out the possibility of adequate explanation of certain kinds of facts, particularly in the fields of ethics and psychology, or in oth-

3. Köhler, PVWF, 13. Köhler is not in full sympathy with the view expressed. Cf. *Ibid.*, 35-37, 410-411, 413.

ers where human preferences and volitions must enter in. Cause and effect relationships simply do not account, in any satisfactory sense, for the occurrence of our ideas or our preferences. For this reason philosophers and even scientists themselves have condemned the inadequacies of the scientific method. In the realm of fact, says Blanshard, genius is no better than lunacy; better and worse are contrasts which no science which deals exclusively in facts can indulge in.⁴ The critic of science and of scientists may say:⁵

You give us correct but misleading statements about man so long as your statements refer to mere facts and not to the very essence of the human world, to value and to insight in values. Lastly, science is a destructive agent in that it tends to demolish not only this or that particular valuation of man, but even his belief in value as such, as a principle that transcends mere facts.

The self-limitation of science to facts of a mechanical and atomistic nature blinds it to other facts just as significant--facts which point to a different kind of rationality and to an objective order of goodness. Socrates saw this danger of missing part of the truth in his day;⁶ and Bowne represented the opinion of many when he wrote:⁷

4. Blanshard, NT, I, 463.

5. Köhler, PVWF, 32. Köhler is not precisely stating his own view. Cf. *ibid.*, 35-36, 410, 411.

6. Plato, Phaedo, 97b-99d.

7. Bowne, MET, 296; cf. THE, 290.

But as to science, we must remember the relativity and incompleteness of actual science. If it will hold for a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases, it will do all we can ask of it.

The natural sciences cannot really challenge a rational good, for they are by their choice of methods excluded from the realm of knowledge where the rational good may be found. Its rationality lacks a full-blooded vitality--its method is rational only with respect to the limited purpose which called it into being. The great contributions of the established descriptive and experimental sciences should not be ignored or disparaged, but these contributions must not blind men to its shortcomings and inadequacy to deal with man's ethical and spiritual problems, which are, after all, the fundamental ones.

ii. The second view: authoritarianism. The second classification of beliefs about the objective world which purport to offer a challenge to the rational good is that which asserts the domination of the world by an arbitrary will which is indifferent to humanity and its standards of valuation. These beliefs include primitive animistic conceptions, theological views of God as an inexorable potentate, and the notions of fatalists or other persons who have a continuous quarrel with the universe. In animism, worshippers are filled with a superstitious fear of evil spirits or gods whose capricious demands have no logical ground or explanation--they are wholly irrational, and are met as well as can be by the practice of irrational magic

and sacrifice. Mohammedanism represents God as a supreme potentate who demands complete submission of his servants (to whom he is merciful). Even though Allah is cruel to his enemies,⁸ however ungodlike that may seem to most modern Christians, he is probably not more cruel than the God of Calvinistic theology has been represented by some of its adherents,⁹ for the latter God has been said to vent his wrath upon infants, and his mercy toward men or his condemnation of them is unpredictable.

As for the notions of fatalists or disgruntled persons--not all, of course, regard the world as under the domination of will. Many see it as contingent. However, James Thomson's "The City of Dreadful Night" describes a divine being who delights in visiting woes upon mankind and is consequently not bound by human standards of rationality and goodness.

Such views carry little conviction with the majority of thinking people. They appeal more to emotional persons, or to those who have experienced frustration. The main argument against them is that they do not adequately account for the whole experience of mankind. Science itself has overcome any argument for animism; and common sense prohibits worship of a God who is arbitrary, unfair, or unpre-

8. See the Koran, Chap. III, 32, 45; Chap. VI, 89; Chap. X, 157; Chap. XXII, 250-251; Chap. XL, 352; Chap. XLII, 359.

9. See M. Wigglesworth, "The Day of Doom."

dictable. Human beings often show more of divine nature. And men who think of God as a tyrant who loves to torment them simply accuse the divine of originating evils which actually have other causes; if they would be rational, many of these causes might be pointed out to them. They ignore the good that comes to them and magnify the evil--an irrational procedure. Rationality calls for an ever-widening inclusion of facts in a man's account of things--hence these beliefs constitute no fundamental challenge to the rational good.

iii. The third view: pessimism and fictionalism. The third mode of conceiving of an irrational world is that of the pessimists. There are moments when most human beings feel strongly inclined to be Schwarzseher. Values seem illusory and the apparent goods which come to mankind, when viewed more comprehensively, are seen to be evils, for they make possible to mankind the great evil of survival. To live is to desire, to desire is to be frustrated and to suffer; suffering is evil, therefore life is an evil. This theme recurs in Schopenhauer's writings, and reaches a climax in such passages as the following:¹⁰

But the present is always passing through his hands into the past; the future is quite uncertain and always short. Thus his existence, even when we consider only its formal side, is a constant hurrying of the present into the dead past, a constant dying. But if we look at it from the physical side; it is clear that, as our

10. Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 401-402.

walking is merely a constantly prevented falling, the life of our body is only a constantly prevented dying, an ever-postponed death.

In the same minor key sound forth such expressions as that the life of man and brute alike "swings like a pendulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui"; this is true because the essential nature of life is to will and to strive; it is a nature "which may be very well compared to an unquenchable thirst."¹¹ This is the worst of all possible worlds, for if it were any worse, it could not endure; all life would cease.¹²

Blind irrational will, the deepest reality in the universe, is the agency back of all activity. This will is inscrutable--it is ungoverned by reason in its original status. It is postulated because of the fact that¹³

in everything in nature there is something of which no ground can ever be assigned, of which no explanation is possible, and no ulterior cause is to be sought.

Some temporary alleviation of this otherwise completely hopeless situation may be found by some persons in artistic contemplation.¹⁴

Most extreme of the pessimists whose writings are available is Prince Troubetzkoy, who asserts dolefully that¹⁵

11. Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 401-402.

12. Cf. Wright, HMP, 364.

13. Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 153, 230, 354.

14. Schopenhauer, SEL, 120, 127-128; WWI, I,

15. Troubetzkoy, art.(1917), 179-181.

. . . Life in its entirety, always repeats the same vicious circle, spinning on its axis like any stupid top.

.
Every life struggles to rise above the earth like the butterfly, only to fall back, without hope of respite, and be blended with the dust.

.
What we now experience is no longer the mere absence of rational meaning, no longer the disappointment of failing to reach the goal; it is something far more excruciating. . . . We see the meaning of life, for which we were in search, transformed into an object of mockery.

A type of thought which takes goods to be illusory after the manner of pessimists but from a different motive is fictionalism, of which Vaihinger's philosophy of the "as if" is illustrative. This philosophy owes much to Kant's phenomenalism. According to Vaihinger, "all ideals, logically considered, are fictions."¹⁶ The presence of fictions is proved by the contradictions, the antinomies that are generated. Fictions are useful inventions,--they "are mere temporary halting-places for thought and have no bearing on reality."¹⁷ In a manner similar to that of pragmatism, fictionalism looks to action and to practical consequences as the end of thought; and the fact that an idea is false does not preclude the possibility of its being useful.¹⁸ Good and values are unreal, for¹⁹

16. Vaihinger, PAI, 46-47.

17. Ibid., 66, 100.

18. Ibid., pref., viii.

19. Ibid., 124.

the only thing that is real and will remain real is the observable unchangeability of phenomena, their relations, etc. Everything else is a mere illusion with which the psyche plays about.

Such a nihilistic treatment of goods and values contradicts both common sense and sound reason, for over and over again the power of ideas, ideals, truth, and love, as against "the observable unchangeability of phenomena" has been demonstrated. Today, as ever, "the pen is mightier than the sword."

If it were able to describe the whole of life as well as it characterizes men's blacker moods, pessimism would constitute a challenge of considerable significance to the rational good. But if a man will have it that good is really bad, that value is an illusion, that the world is only intelligible when it is irrational,²⁰ then he is arbitrary and subjective, and his account of things, while it may be intriguing, cannot be authoritative.²¹ Most men choose to be rational rather than irrational.

iv. The fourth view: transvaluation. The fourth conception of the irrational character of the world, as presented above, was that there are real, objective goods but that these conflict with ordinary and usual human valuations by reason of their superiority. The usual valuations are not only irrational--they are weak. The fundamental fact in the world, says Nietzsche, who advocates this view, is

20. Urban, IW, 187.

21. Rashdall, TGE, II, 236.

the "will to power." This will simply exists as a primary force in the world.²² In the affirmation of it lies the possibility of realizing the true goods; but only strong men are courageous enough to follow out the implications of ruthlessness and individualism which it demands. The will to power is the metaphysical ultimate, and all things else are instrumental. When the will to power can be adequately realized in an individual, he is a superman or over-man.²³

The usual valuations, those of the Sklaven, bring on decadence in a society--they produce mediocrity or something worse. They deny instead of affirming the will to power.²⁴ Traditional Christianity, for example, fosters a "poor people's God," and honors the weak, simpering virtues of pity, benevolence, and love.²⁵ Democracy, the political code of the herd, is rejected; and in its place is substituted the ideal of men who are strong enough to be "free spirits."²⁶ The inferior race is justified in existing at all, only because it serves as a pedestal for the superior men.²⁷ The latter constitute the aristocratic, ideal class

22. Nietzsche, WTP, II, secs. 533, 552; see also secs. 3, 4, and 6; BGE, sec. 36.

23. Nietzsche, TSZ, Prologue, sec. 3; cf. Perry, PRP, 171-172.

24. Nietzsche, BGE, 57.

25. Nietzsche, GOM, Pref. secs. 5, 6; ANT, secs. 17, 18.

26. Nietzsche, DOD, secs. 199, 201; Wright, HMP, 391.

27. Cf. Barrett, ETH, 243.

of masters; they exercise their strength and create their own morality,--their own way of life, which is one of self-assertion, splendid courage, self-crucifying exertion (for one must not pamper himself). Nietzsche found his ideal in classical Greece--in her splendid art, her intellectual aristocracy, her delight in strong physiques and athletic skill. Nietzsche was convinced that Christianity was chiefly responsible for the loss of these values, and that they must be regained, if at all, by the denial of traditional morality. He describes the reversal thus:²⁸

Perhaps the most solemn conceptions that have caused the most fighting and suffering, the conceptions 'God' and 'sin' will one day seem to us of no more importance than a child's plaything or a child's pain seems to an old man.

On Nietzsche's view truth can no longer be regarded as a rational ideal, if the true goods are to be gained. This is evident when he writes that²⁹

the falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it. . . . The question is how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving. . . . And we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong) are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of logical fictions. . . man could not live.

If one is to take Nietzsche seriously, it is evident that he discards the usually accepted principles of rationality, for he asserts the absence of any end or goal in the universe,³⁰ and declares that although destruction (presum-

28. Nietzsche, BGE, 75.

29. Ibid., 8.

30. Nietzsche, WTP, 425; BGE, 20.

ably of everything that thwarts the will to power) is illogical, "the Nihilist does not believe in the necessity of being logical."³¹

The only way one may take Nietzsche seriously is to look for what he was trying to do. His inconsistencies are difficult if not impossible to reduce to rationality--he seems to intend to be provocative and exciting rather than logical.³² But underlying his demand for a transvaluation of values, back of the condemnation of the old insipid order of human mediocrity, he seems to have something of the same idea in mind as Socrates had in the following speech:³³

I only wish, Crito, the people could accomplish the greatest evils, that they might be able to accomplish also the greatest good things. Then all would be well. But now they can do neither of the two.

Thus it may be that Nietzsche's radical and paradoxical language conceals the true underlying rationality of his chief purpose--to rid the social order of hypocrisy, weakness, resentment, envy, mediocrity, and meanness of spirit. There is nothing in the conception of the rational good which conflicts with this aim, and in so much Nietzsche offers no real challenge to the rational good.

However, Nietzsche is irrational in his method, even

31. Nietzsche, WTP, 425.

32. Cf. Wheelwright, CIE, 128.

33. Plato, Crito, 44d.

though his beneficent purpose be acknowledged. His view is partial; his ideas of men and things are too absolute in some respects, for he would have a man either master or slave, and good either the expression of the will to power or nothing.³⁴ In other words, Nietzsche's ideal is too restricted, too one-sided, too prejudiced. Merely to dismiss the goods or values to which he is opposed does not blot them out of existence, nor refute their claims, nor prove them irrational.

One other point as raised by Barrett may be noted.³⁵ Nietzsche's view does not reveal fully what shall be the function of the superman, beyond the fact that he will exult in his power and in his anticipation of the eternal recurrence. But an idle, aimless perfection is an irrational culmination of any effort. The likely occupation of supermen would be war, which unfortunately means the destruction of all values, to a considerable extent even those of the victor,

Various features of Nietzsche's philosophy lack sufficient ground to be acceptable. For example, the world as driven wholly by blind will is an hypothesis untrue to the totality of facts, some of which point to a rational teleology. The assumption that the masses must serve as step-

34. Cf. Wheelwright, CIE, 128.

35. Barrett, ETH, 244.

ping-stones for the few masters is contrary to the rational principle that men benefit themselves as they benefit others--a theory at least as old as Socrates.³⁶ Nietzsche contradicts the rational good, for the most part, but it may be said that his contribution, if he has been rightly interpreted, is greater than his challenge. Rationality is largely determined by purpose, by the intended end.

v. The fifth view: mysticism. The fifth mode of conceiving of the world's irrational character is one which declares that the real goods of the world are inaccessible to the discursive reason, and must be comprehended by other means. Conceptual treatment of them, attempts to define them, are futile; real goods and rational valuations are incommensurable.

This viewpoint may be broken up into two problems, the metaphysical and the epistemological, of which the latter, which is concerned with the ways other than reason by which one may know reality, will be treated in a later portion of this chapter. The metaphysical problem will deal briefly with the goods themselves, with what is regarded as real.

Mysticism is the type of philosophy which approximates this point of view most nearly. In this discussion it will neither be feasible nor necessary to separate religious from philosophical mysticism. The question to be

36. Plato, *Apol.*, 25c-e; cf. *Rep.*, 335.

considered is, how does the mystic think of the real, and in what way is his thinking opposed to the idea of a rational good?

According to Josiah Royce, the mystic supposes the real to be indefinable.³⁷ Nothing can be said about the real without contradiction, since the necessary judgment represents a finite viewpoint about an absolutely all-inclusive unity which contains even the knower himself.³⁸ Any statement is limited to an abstract and partial meaning and is therefore false--it cannot tell the whole truth. Any partial reality is scorned by the mystic; he desires only the genuine, the one reality. Bennett describes the mystics. They³⁹

turn their backs on everything that we include under the terms culture and civilization. They leave behind the whole elaborate system of goods which men have discovered and laboured to establish. For action they substitute contemplation; for society, solitude; for reason ecstasy.

Since the ultimate reality cannot be described without falsifying the reality, many mystics have given up the attempt. But not all; and some of the keen reasoners in the history of thought have been mystics.⁴⁰ If one reasons, he must ascribe some predicate, character, or quality

37. Royce, WI, I, 80-83, 186, 188, 191-192. Quoted in Bennett, SOM, 29.

38. Hocking, TP, 380, 381, 384.

39. Bennett, SOM, 15.

40. Hocking, TP, 390.

to whatever he names as real. Thus it is, that in mysticism, God or the Real has also been called the Good. The reason for this has been, as Hocking shows, that some mystics waver.⁴¹

We may refrain from calling the Real 'good,' for fear of limiting it to our conceptions of goodness, and yet believe that 'good' comes nearer the truth than 'evil.' And while hesitating to assert that the Real is 'mental' or 'personal'--for the mentality we know requires a non-mental environment to live and grow in, and the personality we know needs a society of other persons around it to play its very partial role in--the mystic still implies, when he identifies the Real outside us with the ultimate self within us, that 'mind' or 'spirit' would come nearer the truth than 'matter' or any other non-mental thing. Thus, while mystics have commonly been in trouble with an orthodox tradition which insists on the literal personality of God, they have commonly referred to their Real as 'God.' And Spinoza, who maintained a stricter neutrality than most, used the expression 'Natura sive Deus,'--Nature or God.

For the mystic, then, God is the essence of all good, for which or for whom all lesser goods or human values are gladly renounced.⁴² Such a 'world-flight' contradicts the elements of the rational good which call for its realization in nature and society and for the inclusion of all sorts of facts within it. This renunciation of the world seems insufficiently concerned with social progress; and it refuses to face realistically the actual facts of human experience. It is less ready to bear the ills that plague mankind than it is to "fly to others that we know not of." The extreme otherworldliness of mysticism is not the way of the rational good.

41. Hocking, TP, 392; he quotes Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 9, vi.

42. Bennett, SOM, 29; quotes Plotinus, Enneads, VI, vii, 34.

vi. The sixth view: realism or factualism. The sixth way of conceiving of the irrationality of the world was expressed thus: It was said that existence is weighted with an irrational element which by its very nature conflicts with reason, law, and order. Contemporary writers who hold this view are numerous. Among them are William James, E.G. Spaulding, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Otto, and M.R. Cohen. The latter writes:⁴³

Existence in the actual world is more than rational connectedness and . . . it cannot be entirely grasped by mere reasoning.

.
There is thus something which will always be for us beyond rational form or system, and in that sense appropriately called irrational.

Spaulding designates this irrational element as "chance" and the "Valueless" and thinks of it as a nonrational aspect of nature.⁴⁴ Otto calls it the "numinous"--an obscure depth "which is not accessible to our power of conceiving, and which is therefore called the non-rational."⁴⁵ Russell compares the action of nature to a state of anarchy.⁴⁶ James feels that if the world is one orderly, purposive, rational system, then the fight we are in "is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will."⁴⁷

43. Cohen, RN, 136.

44. Spaulding, WOC, 276; art.(1912), 241; Cf. Brightman, IPKI, 19.

45. Otto, TH, 75; quoted in Baillie, IOR, 251.

46. Russell, ABCR, 196.

47. James, WTB, 61; Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 394, quotes.

As a matter of fact, this conception of irrationality in nature is one of the most ancient of all views, appearing in numerous religions, and in philosophies at least from Plato's time. Before Plato, Anaxagoras felt that he had to account for the order and harmony that existed--apparently he felt that disorder and disharmony needed no explaining. And Empedocles explained the irrational motions and events by a principle of hate or strife.⁴⁸

Plato was keenly aware of the evil, chaos, and contradiction in the world. Wild motions surge in the cosmos, and wild emotions in the soul.⁴⁹ Neither soul nor cosmos is in the complete control of reason--for besides reason, which is the efficient cause, there is a rival cause which is responsible for "accidental and irregular effects."⁵⁰ This rival of reason is named "Errant Cause."⁵¹ It is irrational--a kind of unpredictability which to a considerable extent baffles both the finite and divine minds, although God copes with it successfully when he exerts himself.⁵² It is necessity--the state of things which exists "in the absence of God,"⁵³ when the composite elements of

48. See "Fragments" in Nahm, SEGP, 130-131, 150-151.

49. Plato, Rep., 439c,d,e.

50. Plato, Tim., 46e.

51. Ibid., 48a.

52 Ibid., 68d, e; 53b; 30a.

53. Ibid., 53a, b.

the world possess only aimless motion.⁵⁴

What Plato means exactly by his figures to express the irrationality of the world is a controverted point among interpreters. At various places⁵⁵ he intimates that some achievements are impossible because of the refractory nature of the materials from which the world must be formed. Whether it is mechanical causation,⁵⁶ chance,⁵⁷ the conflict of divine purposes by which one purpose necessarily excludes some other,⁵⁸ or the nature of things sensed as brute facts or immediate ideas⁵⁹ is impossible to determine with any great degree of certainty from Plato's description. But the fact remains that necessity arises out of the aimlessness and incoherence of things, in the absence of God, hence in the absence of order and logical grounding.⁶⁰

The conflict of necessity with reason is one that occurs in nature, as Plato conceives of it.⁶¹ It does not occur in the mind of the Artificer, for he is not obligated

54. Plato, Tim., 52e, 53a.

55. Ibid., 30a, 32b, d; 37d; 53b.

56. Plato, Tim., Bury's footnote, Engl. page 109.

57. Cornford, PC, 164.

58. Ritter, EPP, 376-378.

59. Taylor, CPT, 300; Demos, POP, 12.

60. Plato, Tim., 53a, b.

61. Ibid., 56c.

to have anything to do with it as he would be if it were a part of his own consciousness. God could rest serene in his contemplation of ideas; he entered voluntarily into the task of reducing unreason to reason.⁶² The process was hindered by the factor of necessity, but the result is a highly desirable one,⁶³ especially in view of the fact that the former chaotic condition is transformed into a self-acting, self-sufficing universe⁶⁴ in which other valuable results can be wrought out by lesser gods and presumably by men.

The "ever-existing Place" "Wherein" all process occurs is the "Receptacle," otherwise called "Mother," "Nurse," and "a Kind, invisible and unshaped."⁶⁵ The receptacle contained all the "suchlikes" (material possibilities of becoming) before the generation of the universe, when they were "always circling round"⁶⁶ and there was no "reason or measure in anything."⁶⁷ Every variety of appearance is manifested in the receptacle; its motions are irregular, and its contents are shaken like grain being separated from the chaff. It is upon the contents of the receptacle that God begins the task of introducing order and reason by "first marking

62. Plato, Tim., 29e, 30a.

63. Ibid., 33a,b; 34a, 53b.

64. Ibid., 33d, 34a.

65. Ibid., 48e-53c.

66. Ibid., 49e.

67. Ibid., 53a.

them [i.e. the suchlikes of earth, air, fire, and water] out into shapes by means of forms and numbers."⁶⁸ The receptacle is a permanent factor of reality, along with the pattern (model, form) and God (the Artificer). In it is found necessity, the errant cause, which makes the receptacle a hindrance, yet a necessary hindrance (if a world is to exist) to God's plan.

To speculate here upon the ultimate or real nature of the receptacle, what Plato intended to symbolize, or what it may mean for modern interpreters, is beside the point. There are numerous capable interpreters whose conclusions differ.⁶⁹ The point is that a rational account of the world, from Plato's point of view, cannot assume that the world is completely orderly, coherent, intelligible, rational in itself--reason must operate upon it, and make it as perfect as possible. Reason is a teleological principle which must persuade indeterminate "suchlikes" (potentialities) to take on regular motions and harmonious relationships rather than to remain irrational. The irrational element in the world is thus not absolute, not wholly incorrigible; evils can be transmuted, and a rational good is possible--it is even in large measure already achieved.

This view, thus expressed, is not a refutation of the possibility of a rational good, but is rather an il-

68. Plato, Tim., 53b.

69. Cf. Cornford, Demos, Taylor, Ritter, Archer-Hind, Lutoslawski, and others.

lustration of the problem which it confronts, and of the way in which it may be articulated. Most of the so-called challenges to the rational good are challenges to other attempts to harmonize the contradictions in our experience of nature. Any normal human effort (thought or action) aims both to be rational and to achieve the good. Others may see his system as nonsense, but to the man who forms it, it appears as light and truth. "The philosopher seeks a world that is intelligible even when, as in the case of Schopenhauer, to be intelligible it must be irrational."⁷⁰ To aim at unintelligibility is self-defeating.

4. Epistemological views which make concessions to the irrational

The foregoing discussion in this chapter has dealt with objective aspects of irrationality, and has considered how experienced metaphysical facts have been interpreted in important philosophies. The following section will be concerned with epistemological or subjective irrationality--with views that reject or repress reason and thus challenge the rational good. As Rader asserts:⁷¹

Anti-intellectualism has been part of the mental climate of the age. Among the creeds which have contributed to the revolt against reason may be mentioned Henri Bergson's theory of the superiority of instinct and intuition, Oswald Spengler's preference for the more romantic and activist phases of culture, Giovanni

70. Urban, IW, 187.

71. Rader, NC, 22.

Papini's exaggerated interpretation of the pragmatism of Wm. James, Vilfredo Pareto's emphasis upon sentiment and illusion as the basis of social action, and such voluntaristic creeds as Gabriele d'Annunzio's theatrical romanticism, Charles Maurra's passionate nationalism, Maurice Barre's "philosophy of energeticism," Giovanni Gentile's "philosophy of the pure act," and Houston Chamberlain's theory of militarism and racial imperialism.

In this section, so far as the attempt is capable of being realized, various elements of the revolt against reason will be considered under the following headings: (1) Irrational sources of belief; (2) the repudiation of belief, scepticism; (3) epistemological dualism; (4) the will to believe, voluntarism; (5) belief on the basis of immediate perception or insight, mysticism, intuitionism.

1. Irrational sources of belief. Well-expressed in the language of James is the fact that⁷²

Reason is only one out of a thousand possibilities in the thinking of each of us. Who can count all the silly fancies, the grotesque suppositions, the utterly irrelevant reflections he makes in the course of a day? Who can swear that his prejudices and irrational beliefs constitute a less bulky part of his mental furniture than clarified opinions?

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The mode of genesis of the worthy and the worthless seems the same.

The "mode of genesis" referred to is the life of feeling, desire, emotion, and sensation. A man's first disposition to call a thing good arises from a feeling of pleasure.⁷³ Infants, as James says in a well-known passage, experience

72. James, PP, I, 552.

73. Hobhouse, RG, 72.

naught but "a blooming, buzzing confusion."⁷⁴ Impulses run riot in the child's consciousness; bodily organization and structure rather than mental activity is responsible for whatever harmony and order the child's ideas possess. As he develops, the life of feeling comes gradually under control; but it is doubtful that even the most stoical ever completely subdues his imagination and emotions.

How true this is may be gathered from observation of men, from introspection, or from literature. Most men heed their desires and impulses to near exclusion of the claims of reason. "Wild" emotion and "calm" reason--thus do many writers describe man's inner life. Plato's allegory of the charioteer illustrates the point. The ill-bred, untamed animal represents the life of sense; the thoroughbred represents the spirited element in man. Both are active, energetic, and in need of control; hence the part of the charioteer, who symbolizes reason. Reason does not originate its materials and task, but is faced with the problem of organization and control.⁷⁵

In the realm of practical conduct, morals and ethics, the undisciplined following of impulses is generally recognized to be self-defeating. The man who seeks pleasure or happiness without regard for other goods, experience reveals, will come to a sad disillusionment. A man who seeks

74. James, PP, I, 488.

75. Plato, Phaedr., 246a ff.

power exclusively must seek some kind of power: political, economic, military, physical, or intellectual. In general, to seek one of these alone will mean that, in the long run, deterioration will set in as a result of the lack of one or more of the others. Hence the need of a principle of guidance in one's life to keep it balanced, desire by discipline, means by ends.

Is the life-force perhaps more fundamental than reason as a directive agency? So-called modernism in philosophy sponsors the viewpoint says Urban.⁷⁶

Life is perpetually at war with thought, and the forms of reflective thought are made only to be broken, all goals are set only to be surpassed. The only absolute truth is that there is no such truth.

James supports the notion of the ultimate power of life over reason in his description of the faith-ladder, which he says all people use in their thinking. "It is life exceeding logic, it is the practical reason for which the theoretic reason finds arguments after the conclusion is once there."⁷⁷ This thought has also been expressed by Borden Parker Bowne, who is reported to have reiterated frequently in his lectures to students that "life is deeper than logic." And a man from the medical ranks indicates what is probably a common sentiment among professional men, that "intelligence is almost useless to those who possess

76. Urban, IW, 29.

77. James, APU, 328-329.

nothing else."⁷⁸ Even more radically than any of the men yet mentioned, Nazi theorists teach the primacy of life and instinct over reason.⁷⁹ In the minds of different men the same creed means something different, but they all mean that reason is being challenged as an end-in-itself that should completely rule men's lives. This creed is a kind of reverberation from the world-shaking creed of Kant--that the practical reason is the basis of our belief in fundamental things, and not the theoretical reason.

Again, in art, subjective emotional states often result in monstrosities when they are embodied in some medium. One type of art which portrays emotions is that called "expressionism"--a type often powerful. Emotion in it is the very "steam of art." Its emphasis rests upon the making of the art work an expression of the total life of the artist, but this tends to become chiefly the expression of feeling. The steam needs "to be kept in a boiler." In art, as in ethics and in life, the challenge to reason, if it leads to successful resistance to reason, also leads in the long run to chaos.⁸⁰

Thus in different ways the life of emotion and feeling is asserted, and the principle of reason is relegated to the background,--in extreme cases practically into the

78. Carrel, MTU, 137.

79. See Kolnai, WAW, 193, 194ff. Also 202 ff.

80. Helps from notes taken in Professor Brightman's course in Aesthetics.

discard. This situation must be recognized and acknowledged by all, and seems to be a canker in the very heart of any rational good. There is no question but that it is a challenge which must be overcome by reason if the idea of a rational good is to be maintained.

However, the challenge is probably less serious than its external appearance would indicate. There has been no claim that rationality springs full-grown from its sources, as Minerva sprang from the forehead of Jove; but rationality must be earned, and it develops as an organic growth. Reason must wrestle (and grow by the exercise) with impulses, desires, and emotions, and build a rational structure out of them. As Hobhouse insists:⁸¹

The stupidest human being outside an idiot asylum is not guided by pure impulse alone. . . . Irrational as the average life may seem. . . it is orderly when compared with the chaos of spluttering impulses which would remain if the element of reason were once for all abstracted.

A sane view, acceptable to many with widely variant metaphysical positions, a view which neither denies reason nor assumes its omnipotence, is that of Balfour. He writes:⁸²

If we have to submit, as I think we must, to an incomplete rationalization of belief, this ought not to be because in a fit of intellectual despair we are driven to treat reason as an illusion; nor yet because we have deliberately resolved to transfer our allegiance to irrational or non-rational inclination; but because reason itself assures us that such a course is, at the

81. Hobhouse, RG, 19.

82. Balfour, FOB, 67.

lowest, the least irrational one open to us. If we have to find our way over difficult seas and under murky skies without compass or chronometer, we need not on that account allow the ship to drive at random. Rather ought we to weigh with the more anxious care every indication, be it positive or negative, and from whatever quarter it may come, which can help us to guess at our position.

In spite of the lowly manner of the origin of ideas, the powerful influence of practical and vital interests, a rational good is still possible. Rationality is a goal that must be won.

ii. The repudiation of reason, scepticism. The second kind of epistemological challenge to the rational good appears in the repudiation of belief, both in reason and in objective goods. Some of the words used to describe the enemies of reason and of certain rational values are interesting. For the most part, they are not commonly used; this is probably because few people really deserve to be described by them. Some of these words are: misanthropist, misogynist, misogynist, misologist, and misoneist. The common terms which are akin to the term misologist are sceptic, agnostic, and anti-intellectualist. The first two of these indicate doubt more than hatred of reason; all three deprecate the power of reason to grasp reality.

Men normally find it much easier to accept than to doubt their reasoned conclusions. There are no completely sceptical persons, for such extreme distrust of reason leads to self-annihilation. Most of the early sceptics were little more than clever rhetoricians, able to invent reasons

for repudiating the knowledge attained by reason (or by some other means). Hume confessed that his scepticism seemed impracticable when he was in certain moods.⁸³ And in his book Scepticism and Animal Faith Santayana has declared the impossibility of maintaining the skeptical attitude.⁸⁴ Thus the challenge is partially met by the inability of skepticism to sustain itself.

However, it is a hardy growth, and crops up regularly from generation to generation. It appears in unexpected places, in response to diverse motives, **not** infrequently, as in the cases of Hume, Kant, Santayana, and Bradley, being a by-product of attempts at rational explanation. The view of Santayana will serve to illustrate the trend toward skeptical withdrawal from certain crusades of reason.

Santayana proposes that essences resembling Platonic forms are the immediate data of experience. They are changeless, inert, subsistent, known by contemplation.⁸⁵ Essences become embodied in the material world (which all conscious creatures accept on animal faith) by accident or chance. "A world of accidents, arbitrary and treacherous, first lends to the eternal a temporal existence and a place in the flux."⁸⁶

83. Hume, EHU, Bk. I, Part IV, Sec. VII; quoted in Wright, HMP, 208.

84. Santayana, SAF, 40, 67, 108.

85. Santayana, ROM, 84; quoted in Blanshard, NT, I, 434.

86. Loc. cit., both references.

Whatever is behind essences to cause among them the order and arrangement that we know, is hidden from our knowledge, for Santayana says:⁸⁷

The mind cannot pursue the roots of things into the darkness; it cannot discover why they exist; it must be satisfied with noting their passing aspect, which is but an essence; and it must follow the chase, carried by its own galloping substance, to see what aspect they may wear next.

A man is compelled to act in order to sustain life; this action of both men and animals is done on faith. But knowledge is beyond the power of reason; the only thing anyone can be sure of is the realm of essence.⁸⁸ The best that one can do with the material world is, as far as possible, to escape it.

Santayana's viewpoint is an interesting variation of the Platonic and Kantian schemes of the Eternal and the Becoming, or the noumenal and phenomenal realms. But, says Blanshard in criticism,⁸⁹

stripped of the glamour with which a splendid prose has invested it, 'the life of reason' is a life of servitude to the irrational. Rationality becomes animal luck.

One suspects that the underlying motive is similar to that which moved the Epicureans--the desire for equanimity of spirit which no restless, necessarily futile search for the ultimate causes of things will permit. If no dis-

87. Santayana, ROM, 103-104; Blanshard, NT, I, 435.

88. Edman, POS, 479.

89. Blanshard, NT, I, 438.

covery is possible, it is irrational to seek.

Such a viewpoint "poisons the wells" against venturesomeness, inventiveness, and a broadening conception of the good life. It promotes ennui and defeatism by emphasizing the uncertainties of human experience more than the certainties, so far as practical, ethical, everyday pursuits are concerned; for there exists "no necessity in the relation between cause and effect, and no assurance that law is constant."⁹⁰ Again, "no moment, no event, and no world can insure the existence or the character of anything beyond it."⁹¹ If these statements express fact, then a rational good is out of the question. Indeed one cannot be rational; reason loses all foundation of requiredness or necessity at the beginning.

In some quarters, the doubting tendency has become cynical and sophisticated. When man and his values are negated by the educated, the skeptical attitude must penetrate the thinking of the masses after a time. When that occurs⁹²

no principle will seem worth defending. What after all are principles? The only principle that still holds is: I want to be left alone. . . . Without any conviction whatsoever nobody can be expected to have much courage.

The cynical attitude expresses itself in a "willingness to combine the incompatible" and in the "denial of all

90. Santayana, ROM, 111; in Blanshard, NT, I, 435.

91. Santayana, ROM, 114; ROE, 80-81; Blanshard, NT, I, 435.

92. Köhler, PVWF, 33. Köhler quotes an unnamed man.

finality."⁹³ It is seen in such criticism of the rational function as the following:⁹⁴

A dog is content to turn round three times before lying down; but a man would have to invent an explanation of it. These explanations are often fantastic and rationalistic in the highest degree. There is not a single human social institution which has not originated in hit or miss fashion, but, nevertheless, every one of these institutions is justified by some rationalizing argument as the best possible, and, what is worse, the community demands the acceptance of these arguments as a precondition of happy social life.

This account does injustice to the aims of reason which are not, when it is at its best, to "invent" explanations nor to justify the status quo as the "best possible," nor to compel acceptance of irrational arguments. For reason does not invent, but discovers logical connections and relations; it does not justify what it does not see is really best under the circumstances; and the only compulsion it would use is logical compulsion. This is the only true objective reason. Anyone may strike an arbitrary attitude, may accuse and berate reason, but he thereby closes to himself the doors of any possible truth, even that of defending his own cause.

iii. Epistemological dualism. The third division of actual or supposed challenges to rationality from the subjective standpoint is dualism--the separation of thought and thing, knower and known, idea and object. This question

93. Urban, IW, 28.

94. Bridgman, art.(1933), 21.

follows in natural logical succession from the last one discussed, for "perhaps the chief criticism passed on the dualistic theory is that it leads to skepticism."⁹⁵ In the same way that the mind-body problem appears baffling, so the antithetical poles of thought and thing present a perplexing paradox. How do they come into significant relation with each other?

Dualism has been challenged in recent years as being an irrational position because it appears to make knowledge impossible. A great gulf is fixed by it between the knower and the known, or the would-be-known. If the theory is correct, it would seem impossible for anyone to know the external world at all.

The complexity of the problem rests in the fact that there are numerous schemes of explanation on the assumptions of either monism or dualism, and in the further fact that terms (such as object, subject, idea, intuition, etc.) are used somewhat indiscriminately by adherents of both positions. One of the fundamental principles of rationality--a clear understanding and exact use of terms--is violated by the latter procedure.

A high degree of dialectical skill is necessary to establish anything about the idea-object relation beyond immediate experience. If one attempts to employ a catalyst,

95. Knudson, PP, 100.

such as a datum or essence, to bring the two poles together, the problem turns out to be doubled in difficulty, for now the knower must not only grasp the essence, but the essence must in some mysterious way partake of the object. In some way it must be explained "how the character of objects can belong at once to the self and to the world."⁹⁶ Absolute idealism and new realism have attempted to preclude the skeptical outcome of dualism by affirming the unity of idea and object in knowing.

The difficulty which the latter positions have with the problem of error is notorious. If one knows reality directly, it is difficult to see how he can ever labor under an illusion; and if error can be explained as only inadequate finite comprehension, how can any distinction be made between truth and error, since finite comprehension is never fully adequate? If it is said that the adequacy of human comprehension may be tested by the coherence of the new idea with the body of coherent ideas already possessed, one would feel impelled to ask what value can come from coherence when the whole system of knowledge is infected with error? There is nothing remarkable about the fact that false ideas may cohere--most evil plans can be intelligibly and plausibly worked out.

Hence on the face of it, the theorist must cope with

96. Blanshard, NT, I, 444.

this situation: He must choose between wrestling with the problem with error or with the possible skeptical outcome of dualism.

Is the dualist necessarily shut up in a solipsistic retreat? Must he admit ignorance of the outer world? Almost no dualist would admit the necessity. The task is to produce a rational account of how mind can cross the chasm separating it from things. If this can be done, it is all any theory can do; and to charge a theory of knowledge with being dualistic is not on that account to charge it with being irrational.

Such an intelligible account of knowing was set forth by Borden P. Bowne, who felt that human minds must assume a realistic, common-sense attitude toward the objective world. Thus he writes:⁹⁷

The world itself, though more than a thought, is essentially the expression of a thought, and hence lies open to intelligence. If we assume that the world expresses thought, and that our thought has something universal in it, the ground of the parallelism between our thought and the system becomes apparent, and there is no longer any speculative reason why finite minds should not grasp the cosmic fact. Things, as products of the creative thought, are commensurable with our intelligence and are essentially knowable. Both human minds and cosmic things must be traced to a common source in the creative thought and will. Only thus can the antithesis of thought and thing be transcended and mediated.

An ultimate metaphysical monism which takes the world to be of the nature of mind is the most satisfactory answer to the problem of epistemological dualism. On this view the

97. Bowne, TTK, 314.

physical world can be explained as independent of finite minds but as knowable, their knowledge of it being explained by the fact that all reality below the ultimate Mind has certain qualities and principles in common. The knowledge that a finite mind has of the world is valid, but it is no direct awareness, no copy of the objective order. It is rather a parallel to it in nature and character. The guarantee of correspondence between ideas and objects rests in the ultimate ground of both orders of reality.

No more than any other theory or explanation can this be proved to be rational beyond doubt. To many rational minds it makes little appeal. But it does allow a conception that is in harmony with normal human intuitions; and it permits one to hold to an objective and rational good. It also leaves open the possibility of contingency and hence of evil in the cosmos.

iv. The will to believe: voluntarism. The fourth type of suspected irrationalisms in knowing is that which has been labeled "the will to believe." This is, of course, the title of a book of essays by James, and of its leading essay. James's view of the function of mind is considered in this section, although numerous other philosophers also stress the importance of the will in knowing. James finds value to be an ultimate category, rather than the pure being of traditional rationalistic philosophies. Whatever we believe gets its hold upon us, in the last analysis, because of its

value, its attraction for us. All human activity, even science itself, arises in response to demands which are expressions of values to be realized in action. The result of any activity or belief is the test of its value; i.e. good results justify the action taken. The fruits are the justification of the tree. Hence if by belief in "higher values" such as God, freedom, and immortality one gains added strength and confidence in life, he needs no rational justification of these beliefs.⁹⁸

The meaning which James intended has somehow been misinterpreted; he was not playing a child's game of wishing, but was advocating the making of choices upon which one would risk all his effort and his life if need be. This course of procedure especially lends a degree of certainty and assurance to one's action when ordinary rational processes have contributed their utmost and have failed to yield a satisfactory answer. The world is full of contingency, and is largely undetermined; effort and action, in the situations where reason is unable to advance, make a difference in the outcome of history, and may offer the best possible solution.

Rightly interpreted and given a limited area of operation in individual lives, the will to believe is a rational will. A rational good includes the will to bring it in-

98. These ideas are chiefly from the essay. See also Perry, PRP, 191; Hocking, TP, 156 ff; Barrett, PHI, 352; Townsend, PIUS, 144.

to being, out of the realm of the ideal into actuality. One must be guided by consequences (but not solely by consequences) in order to be rational. The satisfaction of desires is legitimate as long as these are criticized and disciplined. James seems to say (although probably not intending to do so) that a course of action which yields "cash value" has in that result its justification. Not his logic but his sterling ethical character prevented James from advocating reprehensible means to gain his ends. In addition to this lack of rigorous logical reasoning, the irrationality of the will to believe lies in the psychological effect it has upon belief. Some minds will take it as a way of escape from the grueling work of achieving logical consistency, while upon minds in general, the decision that "it shall be held for true" is disastrous to one's assurance of certainty. Hocking describes the effect:⁹⁹

The suspicion that our will has tipped the balance of evidence brands for us the chosen hypothesis as subjective; but a belief is the reference of the mind to an object assumed real, independent, objective. The suspicion of subjectivity therefore destroys belief.

The challenge of the will to believe to the rational good consists in the natural uncritical readiness of common sense to adopt it as final, coupled with the ease of misinterpreting it. A merely subjective good cannot be a rational good--the rational good is more than the actualizing

99. Hocking, TP, 163.

of values. The good that is determined by objective relationships may not coincide with the good that is the result of action. The will to believe cannot be excused from passing under rational criticism.

v. Intuitionism and mysticism. Mysticism employs the method of intuition or immediacy in knowing. It is on the basis of the way of knowing which it employs that it is treated again in this chapter. No type of philosophy is more anti-intellectual than mysticism. The mystic¹⁰⁰

regards conceptual knowledge as ever unsatisfying or meaningless, and immediate experience as the only trustworthy guide and the only solid satisfaction.

The mystics almost alone among people who are found as sharers in every kind of world-culture¹⁰¹ normally are little concerned about the contradictions in experience, between theory and practice. Bennett says:¹⁰²

Intellectual doubts trouble them very little: they are not concerned with philosophical problems. Philosophy, indeed, is one of the hindrances which they try to remove. This attitude is conspicuous among the Christian mystics, but it is not confined to them.

In place of conceptual thinking the mystics tend to substitute the way of illumination; they believe that "it is possible through visions, revelations, or in some other

100. Pratt, RC, 366.

101. Bennett, PSM, 20; Royce, WI, I, 178.

102. Wright, HMP, 623; cf. Royce, WI, I, 83, 86, 144, 177.

superrational manner, to know God or ultimate reality."¹⁰³ Explanation of the awareness of the presence of God is exceedingly difficult, or even impossible; it rests upon a feeling of certainty, and all logical propositions are inadequate to express it. For this reason it is common practice for mystics to couch their meanings in allegories, parables, similes, and metaphors when they try to express themselves. Mystics are greatly handicapped in expression; they are unable to communicate intelligibly with anyone who has not shared experience like theirs. Even though the most intense feeling and clearest certainty may endure but a short time, minutes or a very few hours at most, the experience is a basis of assurance even through periods when ecstasy is absent.

The general method of knowing of the mystics bears a close kinship to that of the romanticists and intuitionists in literature and philosophy, the chief difference being its subject-matter and the use made of its results. Romanticists lay emphasis on heeding the commands of the heart, and on cultivating moods and atmospheres, thus revealing an interest in special or particular types of feeling. This feeling is not that of particular sensations but rather that of sensible states or "tones"; it leads to impulsive rather than to reflective action. Carlyle, for ex-

103. Wright, HMP, 623; cf. Royce, WI, I, 83, 86, 144, 177.

ample, rejected analytic psychology and Utilitarianism because they required too much reasoning.¹⁰⁴

Among the philosophical intuitionists, Bergson follows out most completely the nature and implications of his method. For him intuition is a far more complete and perfect way of knowing than intellectual effort. The former sees whole, sees the real which is invisible and intangible. Time, for example, is apprehended by intuition and completely missed by intellect, which is by nature equipped to get only parts and details, and misses the whole. It is analytic, and cannot explain the great concepts in a way that will correspond to actual experience. The classic example of this failure of intellect to grasp the basic truth is found in the analysis of motion in Zeno's paradoxes where reason becomes muddled up with the idea of infinity.

Ultimate reality, l'élán vital, eludes the grasp of intellect but yields to intuition. Intuition makes no attempt to compare or relate but to comprehend the entire unit with which it is confronted. It is not nearly so useful or practical as intellect, but it brings persons much nearer to the actual pulse beat of reality.¹⁰⁵

It is not in their insistence that truth may be reached by other ways than by discursive reason that in-

104. Höfding, HMP, II, 379.

105. Bergson, CE, 46, 176 ff; See Hocking, TP, 188-194; Urban, IW, 126.

tuitionism, mysticism, or romanticism may be called irrational, but rather in their one-sided abstractionism and opposition to rational and intellectual procedures. From this criticism Bergson may in the main be excused. He grants the practical value of the rational and critical powers of the mind, and would in fact supplement intuition with reason. As will be pointed out in the following chapter, he finds the two functions to have a common ground and origin. Also the milder mystics, those who gain lasting good from their experience, remedy the one-sided and exclusive emphasis, making the rational processes complementary to the life of feeling. In the widest view of the matter, it is not irrational to depend for some help in knowing upon the subconscious mind, which may be, after all, the secret of much of the illumination of the intuitionist, mystic, or romanticist. Irrationality begins when a biased and exclusive conception of the way to acquire knowledge gets the whole right of way.

5. Summary of the chapter

The outcome of the present chapter is about as follows: the supposedly irrational attitudes or aims of several philosophical types have been examined. Some aspects of them are challenges to a rational good, yet each of them has a contribution to make toward a more rational outlook on life.

The challenges consist chiefly in emphases upon a

single point of view which excludes reason; the contributions appear in the fact that each new fact or belief adds to a whole that is more rational and more true than any single part. For example, among the objective aspects of irrationality, extreme pessimism is a negation of the rational good--it is an immoderate and unreasonable philosophy. Yet there is a less extreme variety which does not overlook the evils, but at the same time is not blind to the goods. Some prefer to call the latter realism or an even more eulogistic term.

In any case, too much stress cannot be placed upon the fact that the viewpoints of science, the belief in an objective purpose, a realistic pessimism, a recognition of the vast realms of possibility for human experience, and the conflict between reason and the recalcitrant factors in nature must all be considered in getting a rational account of the universe. According to the definition of rationality of the last chapter, in a rational system none of the points of view or ways of knowing may be arbitrarily omitted. Only if they have no good ground, or if they contradict the most inclusive experience that is self-consistent, would their omission be justified

Thus only the complete repudiation of belief among the supposedly irrational points of view would necessarily be omitted, for it is only the chronic kind of skepticism, the settled way of doubt, that is hopelessly irrational.

Skepticism as a method (dubito ut intelligam), a policy of caution and conservatism, is a healthy symptom of a well-balanced personality; and it is not only admissible, but is required in a rational order or system.

In investigating these various challenges the definition of rationality given above has been reinforced and corroborated. For there it was insisted that rationality involves a dialectic process of exact definition of ideas, wide inclusion of facts, and an ideal aim. In the present chapter the attempt has been made to show what various views are, and what they contribute to a whole view, and in what way, if any, they do violence to a rational good. The ideal goal is a combination of all the possible benefits of different approaches to reality and knowledge in one comprehensive, practical, and universal philosophy--one which shall be as nearly as possible the essence of truth and rationality.

The present chapter has set forth various attempts to dismember the rational from the good, or to discount the one or the other. The following chapter will attempt to show how the rational and the good are related, and to show whether they have any fundamental connections which each a concept necessary to the other. To this task the discussion now turns.

CHAPTER III

THE RATIONAL AND THE GOOD

1. The suspicion of conflict between logic and reality

In the present chapter the central problem for discussion is the relation of rationality and goodness from a logical and an epistemological standpoint. Is there any inevitable necessity which links coherent thought and system to value or good as defined above, on the one hand, and which necessarily connects irrationality with evil on the other? There is uncertainty on this point in contemporary thought. Much mediaeval scholasticism is an illustration that a flawless logic which leads to unprofitable and merely speculative conclusions is possible. In the last chapter various questions which dealt with antagonism to orthodox conceptions of rationality and goodness were reviewed. Many feel with James that logic and the given reality are incommensurable. "Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it."¹

The conflict is widely felt. Of it Otto writes:²

The fact of the matter is that the contemporary man is divided against himself. He is unwilling to forego the practical results based upon the achievements of

1. James, APU, 212.

2. Otto, TI, 172.

men and of science, but he is fearful lest the development and application of scientific method shall deprive human endeavor of meaning and worth. The question is whether this state of mind is necessarily final. Are science and human values by their very nature incompatible, like God and Mammon, leaving us no choice but to serve one or the other?

To put the problem otherwise, it is reducible to the question whether goodness and rationality must be divorced in actual experience. Is there a hopeless conflict between the theoretical and the practical life?

2. The conviction of connection between rationality and goodness

Traditional logic is being critically examined and in many quarters rudely handled in these days. Yet, although logicians dispute about logic, in the dispute³

is always involved the question of 'bona fide logic,' and the question of good faith always involves the question of sincerity and of values which again can be acknowledged but never proved. In other words, it is becoming increasingly evident that the ultimate problem of logic is a problem of values.

This inability to prove values means an inability to furnish universally acceptable evidence. In the final analysis the only proof that anything is a value is that someone likes it. However, some evidence can be offered which many rational minds will accept.

The field of logic is the field of rational meanings, and meaning is a notion in which value and good are necessarily involved. The nature of meaning is derived from val-

3. Urban, IW, 85.

ue or from the objective good to which it points.⁴ It is by logic that a man must bring himself to be rational (in at least a part of its meaning), for logic includes the work of definition, and that of properly connecting and deriving meanings. The interconnection of meanings points to the interconnection of goods and their grounds. In the notion of meaning, rationality and good have a fundamental connection.

i. Plato. This conviction has ancient roots; it is the historic tradition of idealism. Plato has expressed it clearly and unmistakably. For Plato⁵

the Good is the principle of intelligibility; it supplies the criteria and norms by which all rational beliefs are tested.

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 . . . The idea of the Good is the source of all knowledge; it generates all meanings, and validates all true beliefs.

The Good cannot be known except as one pursues it through dialectic--and even then the final knowledge of it is from direct insight. What is meant is that "there is a progression from reason to insight."⁶ No adequate concept of it can be formed by finite reason. Taylor says:⁷

Neither Plato nor anyone else could tell another man what the good is, because it can only be apprehended by the most incommunicable and intimate personal insight.

4. See Urban, IW, 23, 61.

5. Demos, PP, 74; Plato, Rep., 532b, 534b.

6. Demos, loc. cit.

7. Taylor, PLA, 289.

Nevertheless, rational reflection can point to the good, and can call attention to its manifestations in the flux of experience. It is mainly through this ability, in fact, that the rational mind by means of dialectic traces the good, and directs intuition to the good as the ultimate object.

ii. Urban. Urban is convinced that as serious occupations knowing and thinking are in their very nature bound up with valuation.⁸ Truth would be unlovable and discouragingly abstract were it not connected with the good. Modernist philosophies, those which disparage logic and intellectual values, have at their root the denial of the interconnection of meaning and value.

iii. Kant. Kant has shown that by virtue of their nature as rational beings men universally experience a conviction of duty or sense of obligation. This obligation-consciousness is the demand of the moral law which pure reason prescribes.⁹ It commands that men recognize their obligation to be rational. "Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne."¹⁰ Any being with both reason and

8. Urban, IW, 23, 115.

9. Kant, KPV, Bk. I, Chap. I, Sec. 7, 36.

10. Ibid., 35. "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." (Tr. Abbott, in Rand, MCP, 461).

will is bound by the moral law,¹¹ and such a being is required to show his reverence for the law by seeking the realization of the summum bonum in the world.¹²

The summum bonum for Kant is thought of in two ways: (1) The supreme good (virtue) which is the unconditioned condition of happiness; and (2) a whole which combines virtue and happiness.¹³ Virtue is personal--it is the state of a will which is determined by the moral law, a will which strives to make its own attempts to realize happiness the universal maxim for the realization of happiness in other persons. The happiness of the rest of mankind is thus not sought because of personal inclination, but because of the demand of reason. If one loves his own good, he must be willing that this disposition should be universalized so that he wills also the good of others.¹⁴ The determining principle is not the desire for happiness, but the moral law, the sense of ought.¹⁵

How virtue and happiness can unite to realize the summum bonum is the problem which calls especially for the postulate of God. When men respect the moral law, they nat-

11. Kant, KPV, Bk. I, Chap. I, Sec. 7, 36-37.

12. Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. II, Sec. 4, 146.

13. Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. II, Secs. 1, 2, 136-137 ff.

14. Ibid., Bk. I, Chap. I, Sec. 8, theorem iv, 39.

15. Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. I, 131.

usually seek for the realization of the highest good.¹⁶ The law is unconditional; to be rational one must fulfil its insistent demand. But at the same time that reason calls for observance of the moral law it also requires that the outcome be a harmony of virtue and happiness. Kant argues that¹⁷

ist also das höchste Gut nach praktischen Regeln unmöglich, so muss auch das moralische Gesetz, welches gebietet, dasselbe zu befördern, phantasisch und auf leere eingebilddete Zwecke gestellt, mithin an sich falsch sein.

This difficulty calls for the postulate of an intelligent cause of all nature, which is distinct from nature, that shall guarantee the ultimate harmony of virtue and happiness, the possibility of the realization of the summum bonum. Man's experience is that virtue and happiness are often unequal and progress in morality is slow. But if there is a being who controls the whole order, whose values are not inconsistent with human values, then the struggle is not senseless, but fundamentally meaningful. The existence of God is required for intelligibility.¹⁸

Nun war es Pflicht für uns, das höchste Gut zu be-

16. Kant, KPV, Bk. II, Chap. II, Sec. 4, 146.

17. Ibid. Sec. I, 137. "If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to vain imaginary ends, and must consequently be false." (Tr. Abbott, in Rand, MCP, 475).

18. Ibid., Sec. 5, 150-151. "Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the summum bonum; (continued in footnote section of following page).

fördern, mithin nicht allein Befugniss, sondern auch mit der Pflicht als Bedürfniss verbundene Nothwendigkeit, die Möglichkeit dieses höchsten Guts voraussetzen; welches, da es nur unter der Bedingung des Daseins Gottes stattfindet, die Voraussetzung desselben mit der Pflicht unzertrennlich verbindet, d.i. es ist moralisch nothwendig, das Dasein Gottes anzunehmen.

Thus although reason and will are autonomous, when they obey the laws of their own nature they come inevitably to the good, and to its realization. Rationality can find its ultimate satisfaction only in the idea of the good, and the will can be moral only as it strives for the realization of the good, only as it universalizes the maxims of its moral law. The summum bonum is inseparably joined to the fundamental rationality of man and made intelligible by the postulate of the existence of God.

It seems that only a short period of reflection should be needed to establish the connection of good and the rational. The means of ordering life is choice, and choice is possible only as we are presented with goods and their alternatives. Hence "good keeps life from being chaotic."¹⁹ Goodness and rationality coincide.

3. Intuition, reason, and the good

But now the problem of the relation of rationality

consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God." (Tr. Abbott, in Rand, MCP, 479).

19. Dickinson, MOG, 7.

and good may be approached from another direction. Men are motivated by what they like, by their sense of what is good; and this motivation operates vigorously to stimulate the activities of thinking and knowing.²⁰ Liking and desiring occur in mental life earlier than reflection, and the direction of practical reflection and effort, as well as the actual arousing of these, begins in the feeling for values. From the time when the baby cries for the moon and reaches out for it until as an old man he longs for release from a weary existence, the sense of value stimulates him to exert his powers.

In mere value-experience, however, reason does not necessarily play a large part, just because it is usual that feelings occur without being aroused by reflection. Liking and desiring may not correspond with a rational insight into values; in their most primitive stages values depend more upon instinct. There may be no rational understanding of the good, no comprehension of an ought-to-be-liked, no unity or system among likes and desires. To many persons a good which arises out of the coherent wholeness of things is incomprehensible, and an unknown quantity; they cannot be persuaded to let go of their preferences, their prejudices, and their fixations.

Thus the daily living of individual persons may be out of all touch with a rational good. Values are present

20. Urban, IW, 115, 127; Hobhouse, RG, 3.

in great numbers in daily life, but the good and the rational must be striven for.²¹ Value-experiences are not rational in the sense that they fit into a coherent whole from their inception. As a rule they are comprehended by a kind of immediate awareness without reflection, although reason is not prevented from influencing what is valued. As Rader states: "Values... are based upon preference--a nonrational factor--but preferences themselves change in response to knowledge and insight."²² However, when taken at their source, values are not affected by conscious purpose. They are not created by the mind but experienced by it, intuited. As a matter of fact, a man's values may run counter to his purposes, as in the case of the child who intends to dislike his food, but is delighted in spite of himself; and the adult who strives to like a food because it is good for him, but finds the flavor detestable.

It is the immediate values and the goods which reason has explored enough to make familiar that are intuited. If there is an objective good which ought to be liked, its ultimate character cannot be recognized by such immediate perception as is described above; at least not, as Plato insists, until reason has done its part to make this possible.²³ A good (true value) may be liked before its objec-

21. See definitions above, 17-18.

22. Rader, NC, 53-54.

23. See Plato, Rep., 532a, b.

tive nature is understood (i.e. it may be a value before it is recognized to be a good); but the understanding of this nature is a function of reason. The point is that none can say upon the immediate perception of a value that it ought to be liked. One can only assert his own preference. Intuitive grasp has no reasons of its own, but only bare experience. The chance that, out of the myriads of likes and dislikes that men experience, any one of these has the status of an ought-to-be-liked is small enough to make action on the basis of intuition alone a great risk. This is the conclusion intimated in the treatment of the mystical mode of apprehension in the previous chapter.

On the other hand, reason alone cannot satisfactorily settle the problems of value. It can relate a person's values to each other, and note in what direction lies the good to which the systematized body of values points. Reason can determine which values are spurious, and which are instrumental for the good. The function of reason is essentially relating, integrating, making coherent, systematizing, and it performs this task with materials which it does not make but finds in the flow of experience. Pure reason becomes involved in mazes of abstraction and gets lost just as certainly as does intuition. The goal of concrete thinking is a system made orderly out of the chaos of immediate experience.

Probably most modern thinkers would hold that reason

and intuition are not two separate ways of knowing, but rather two distinguishable functions of individual minds.

Bergson says in referring to the relation of intelligence and instinct, which is the primal form of intuition,²⁴ that²⁵

when given their place. . . in the evolution of life, they appear, as it were, two divergent and complementary activities.

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The two activities, which began by mutual interpenetration, had to part company in order to grow; but something of the one has remained attached to the other.

In the introduction to Creative Evolution he speaks of the "certain powers that are complementary to the understanding," thus at least making possible the inference that the understanding is fundamental.²⁶ In any case, either way of knowing is partially dependent upon the other, when the life of man as a whole is considered; and either way is inadequate for certain important aspects of the field of knowledge. In the realm of value this is seen by many philosophers. Dewey, for example, pictures their complementary, yet oppositional functions by the following discussion:²⁷

Whether it be a question of the good and bad in conviction and opinion, or in matters of conduct, or in appreciated scenes of nature and art, there occurs in every instance a conflict between the immediate value-object and the ulterior value-object: the given good, and that reached and justified by reflection; the now appar-

24. Bergson, CE, xii-xiii, 176, 178.

25. Bergson, TSMR, 107-108; CE, 143, 168, 175, 182.

26. Bergson, CE, xii-xiii.

27. Dewey, EN, 402.

and the eventual.

While it is true that a great many thinkers have persisted in elevating one or the other of these functions to a place of pre-eminence while more or less neglecting the other, it is possible that Leighton is not wholly just in his critical estimate of Bergson and James. After asserting that they "insist on the validity of immediate perceptual experience as being the primary datum for philosophy," he says they²⁸

argue that in the conceptualizing process the mind is carried, not deeper into, but farther away from, reality. Percepts are characterized as concrete and dynamic, continuous with the original and ever varying flow of living reality; whereas concepts are static, abstract, pale shadows or skeletons which misrepresent the rich flux of experience, which is the real stuff of things.

This description, as seen from the excerpts and references from Bergson given above, does not adequately describe his view, which is an attempt to explain and justify both ways of knowing. If perhaps Bergson seems to give an undue emphasis to instinct and intuition, this may be justified by the vast neglect of this side of knowing at the hands of most traditional philosophy. Bergson would not use the Kantian language, but in large measure he would endorse the dual recognition of mental functions in Kant's famous statement: "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, An-

28. Leighton, MC, 44.

schauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind."²⁹ For Bergson teaches nothing more unmistakably than that intuition is not self-sufficient.³⁰

It is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it [intuition] rise to the point it has reached. Without intelligence, it would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical interest, and turned outward by it into movements of locomotion.

As for James, his emphasis upon "pure experience"³¹ and his criticisms of intellectualism go to such extremes as to make him vulnerable to charges of prejudice and inconsistency. He writes that the only way to reality is to put off intellectualism and fall back on "raw unverbilized life as more of a revealer."³² Rightly understood, however, James may be seen as fighting for the rights of the intuitive capacity of man, and was led into extremes of speaking because the intellectualism he was fighting was extreme and irksome to his intense spirit. On the whole, he does not discard concepts and discursive reasoning as false or useless, although he struggled mightily to keep them from dominating the philosophical scene.

The opposite emphasis from that of James and Bergson occurs in the system of McTaggart. On the rationalis-

29. Kant, KRV, 95.

30. Bergson, CE, 178.

31. James, ERE, 193; See Barrett, PHI, 139.

32. James, APU, 272-273; see also 256-257; quoted in Barrett, PHI, 188-189.

tic or intellectualistic extreme, he is sure that the dialectic which employs concepts can arrive at full knowledge of the real, and he minimizes the necessity for the need of data from experience.³³ But not all philosophers who wish to do homage to reason go to such extremes. Royce, for example, recognizes the unity of the mental functions in a more balanced form. There is neither pure conception nor pure perception. Both are cognitive processes, but real knowledge, which is the aim of thought, appears only in interpretation, the combination of the two.³⁴

The defense of intuition is called for by the fact that so many regard it as irrational. Plato set the fashion by expressing distaste for the perceptual intuitions of sense-experience. This distaste has been a particular reaction of many to intuitions of the values. Intuitions, it is said, contradict each other, and therefore are false. Intuitions are often manifestly in error, and therefore cannot be trusted anywhere they occur in experience.

While these charges contain a degree of truth, it is based upon a partial view of intuition. Reason also often arrives at erroneous and contradictory ideas. The best thinking that a man can do may be false. When this is the case, it can be remedied in two ways: by reference to whatever intuitions are relevant, and by further criticism from

33. McTaggart, SHD, 46; See Mackintosh, POK, 339.

34. Royce, POC, II, 117-123; Mackintosh, loc. cit.

reason itself on the basis of wider inclusion, greater coherence, self-consistency, etc.

But if reason and intuition are distinguishable functions, they are also complementary functions, and truth, true values, the good, are not comprehended adequately without both. The average man does not greatly trouble himself to distinguish between those things which he likes and those which he ought to like--i.e. to think beyond the immediately practical need--and so the true values are neglected by the masses of people. The theorist, the dialectician, and the reflective person deduce the existence of a subsistent and invisible order of good and of reality from their value-experiences. Thus the chemist or the physicist has arrived at a complex account of atoms, although no one has ever immediately experienced an atom; and at least some philosophers arrive at the notion of the rational good, which to the multitude of people who are involved in the maze and whirl of normal value-experience, seems as unreal as the quantity for which the mathematician's "X" stands.

Value-experience is seen to contain contradictions when it is viewed critically by reason. It is common experience for the value of one person to be a disvalue for another, or for what is a value in one hour to be one's chief antipathy in another. Any value under the exploring process of reason may appear as evil. A familiar example of this occurs with the apostle Paul, who at one time re-

garded the persecution of Christians as a worthy calling, but who finally came to the support of their cause.³⁵

The endeavor of this discussion has been to show that a correlative relationship exists between reason and intuition, between intuition and values, and between reason and the good. The relationship between value and good was treated in Chapter One. Both reason and intuition show a peculiar instability alone; and the same appears to be the case with abstract good and immediate values. No one can be said to have reached a complete rational good until he likes what he ought to like, until his values and his goods coincide, or until his intuitions and his reasoning come together in harmony.

Values are neutral (neither rational nor irrational) until they are defined by reference to a coherent body of knowledge or fact.³⁶

Our values can only be understood and must always be interpreted and criticized in the light of our world view. No one has the right, rationally speaking, to say "This is of value," unless he has related it to everything he knows.

Relating an item "to everything he knows" would be an impossible task if one took it to mean each specific item of knowledge; but it is experientially possible to relate a new value to the coherent whole of one's knowledge, and to re-

35. Acts, Chap. 26.

36. Brightman, ITP, 147.

late it to as many specific items as he has time for. One must be governed by the practical factors of the amount of time he has, the degree of importance of the value, and his own purpose to do the best he can under the circumstances.

Intuitions are not necessarily irrational because of their spontaneity, but they must be made rational. It is probably true that intuition has nowhere the right to make final and dogmatic pronouncements, but neither has reason apart from intuition. Value-experience is part of the whole experience of a person, and sets the task of living thought--the task of making an orderly, coherent and inclusive system of experience; in short the task of realizing the rational good.

4. Results of the comparison of intuition and reason for the good

It appears, then, on the basis of the analysis of the functions of intuition and reason, that the rational and the good have a vital, internal, interdependent relationship. Values are presented in a chaotic immediacy which is bewildering, but which in the systematizing processes of reason begins to take on more significant meaning, and to point to an enduring good. All those values for which reason can find grounds take on the likeness of the rational good, and the body of such values indicates what the most rational of goods must be. "Whatever is reasonably held good," says

Hobhouse, "must not tend to clash with anything else that is reasonably held good."³⁷ The removal of such clashes is the road both to complete rationality and complete goodness--to the rational good.

One warning should be reiterated. Logical coherence and orderly system do not in themselves guarantee a rational good unless they characterize the widest possible range of events or facts. In a limited sense, rational evils are possible; for example, an organized underworld racket, or the Nazi political and military machine. The selection of an inclusive end is as important to rationality as a smoothly working system. The rational good results from the combination of rational ends with rational means. As Hegel puts it: "Sie allein ist das Vernünftige und der Rhythmus des organischen Ganzen."³⁸

The rational good is no single fact, event, or other item of experience, but is an ideal end indicated by the unity of a system of values, progressively discovered and realized by rational minds.³⁹ One who would be rational finds himself aiming at an end which is good, of which, the farther he moves toward it, he sees more and more clearly that it

37. Hobhouse, RG, 78.

38. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Vorrede, 53; in Hegel, SW, II. "This alone is what is rational, the rhythm of the organic whole." (Hegel, SEL, 51, ed. Loewenberg, various trs.). The antecedent of "sie" is "die logische Nothwendigkeit."

39. See Kant, KPR, Bk.II, Chap. II, Sec. 4; tr. in Rand, MCP, 477.

ought to be desired. In the same way one who strives for an enduring good sees eventually, at least, that it can be what it is only by virtue of its being founded in a rational order of things. Both the rationality and the goodness of which men usually speak are relative terms. "Why callest thou me good?" asked Jesus of the rich young man. "None is good save one, even God."⁴⁰ Goodness and rationality are both interdependent ideals and practical ends. The task of human beings, says James,⁴¹

seems at first sight to resolve itself into that of getting a conception which will yield the largest balance of rationality, rather than one which will yield perfect rationality of every description.

The "perfect rationality" is an ideal to strive for; Kant has clearly stated this. Meanwhile "the rational as such is not an established system, but a process governed by a principle."⁴² It is the process by which the ideal good is ever more perfectly apprehended. Even though this ideal of complete realization is ever just beyond man's grasp, its recognition "gives a direction to our efforts and prevents our conduct from sinking back into its animal origin."⁴³

Finally it should be noted that the necessity which links rationality and goodness is not the mechanical neces-

40. Mark, Chap. 10:18.

41. James, APU, 113.

42. Hobhouse, RG, 75.

43. Cohen, RN, 448.

sity which connects physical aspects of the world in a causal chain. Mechanism breaks down in the attempt to account for persons and values.⁴⁴ "At the bottom of all human activities are 'values', the conviction that some things 'ought to be' and others not."⁴⁵ This is the requiredness or necessity of value. "The ultimate inseparability of value and reality is now almost axiomatic; the attempt to divorce them can issue only in unintelligibility."⁴⁶ But there is no mechanical necessity by which a reasoning mind, using correct deductive principles, must arrive at the good. None of this kind of inevitability or rigor exists here. The necessity in the relation between the rational and the good contains an "ought" rather than a "must".

Human rationality is incompletely won, and the good is dimly seen and partially achieved. All that can be affirmed is a reasonable surety that whenever and wherever reason strives to be comprehensive and coherent, the ought-to-be-liked will appear. There is something independent, something recalcitrant and inscrutable about the universe; after man's most strenuous efforts to circumvent an evil, it may still ride roughshod over him. But perhaps far more often it may be persuaded to give a modicum of co-operation. That faith is the basis upon which humanity as a whole rests

44. Blanshard, NT, II, 441.

45. Köhler, PVWF, 35.

46. Urban, IW, Preface, 3.

its hopes for the future. The denial of rational good is the denial of that which most men implicitly believe.

5. Summary of the chapter

In this chapter the attempt has been made to show that rationality and goodness are intimately connected. Logic is itself a value, and whosoever begins a crusade to displace any one kind of logic does so on the basis that another is better. Plato was convinced that the aim of any true science is the good; he thought that good must be the principle of intelligibility.

In an analysis of the functions of intuition and reason, it was indicated that intuition grasps values, but is unable to rise to the ought-to-be-liked, at least not until reason has led the way to it.⁴⁷ The true good is of necessity rational--it is what the whole mind perceives to be required if one wants to be rational and live a life of coherent wholeness.

In the following chapter, the search for possible relationships between the rational good and the real will be pursued. Is everything that is real also rational and good? In what objective realm does the ultimate good lie? Are goods and ideals mere phantoms without objective, enduring status? These problems occupy thought in the pages ahead.

47. Cf. 81, 87 ff. above.

CHAPTER IV

THE RATIONAL GOOD AND THE REAL

In the preceding chapter rationality and the ought-to-be-liked were presented as kindred ideals. Valuations may occur irrespective of the real worth of the thing valued and may be irrational; but a real and objective good is necessarily rational.

1. Reality defined

Reality is anything which has objective validity, which becomes intelligible as it is thought about. The real tends to be determined by these marks: (1) That it does not give rise to self-contradictory judgments;¹ (2) that it has the nature of "common to all" rather than of "special to me";² and (3) that it has an element of permanency and self-identity.³ Various levels of reality may be thought of--some regard the more universal as the more real while others take the more definite and concrete as more ultimately real.⁴ However, there is universality in every individual and individuality in every universal that can be named or recognized. Reality consists of every referent, the idea of

1. Holt, art.(1912), 366; Bowne, MET, 9, 10 (Note that references to MET on this page are to the 1882 ed.); Stace, NOW, 5.

2. Bowne, MET, 8.

3. Garnett, RV, 109-110.

4. Cf. Stace, NOW, 3-4; Bowne, MET, 30-33, 41.

which can become a coherent part of a rational experience.

In so far as the good is bound up with what is enduring and coherent, it has all the objective reality that is needed. This connection of the good and the real cannot be finally proved in the sense of being made acceptable to all minds.⁵ Yet Urban asserts:⁶

The inseparability of the highest value from the most truly real has been at once the venture of faith and the 'axiom of intelligibility' of the greatest thinkers. . . . From Plato to Hegel the deliberate and reiterated identification of being and value has been the hidden spring of traditional thought.

It seems that human life cannot achieve its highest goods without the conviction that reality on the whole is benevolent, self-consistent, and enduring. Leighton presents this thought:⁷

If the spiritual values of human existence at its highest term of development and achievement do not endure, amidst all the changes and chances of this mortal universe, there seems to be no stable or coherent meaning in existence. Then the universe is irrational--indeed it is no universe at all.

2. Modernist and traditional views of the problem

So-called "modernist" philosophers are distinguished from others in part by their willingness to divorce values and goods from reality. They evidently think that criteria, standards, purposes, and evaluations make no difference to

5. Cf. Hoffding, POR, 93, 141.

6. Urban, IW, 14. In quotations value often means the same as good means for this dissertation.

7. Leighton, MC, 463; cf. Alexander, STD, II, 413.

the existence of a world of fact and experience.⁸ Nature is believed to be ruled by inexorable law, with no standard or ideal affecting it except incidentally and secondarily. Professor Montague's definition of the real in The New Realism implies this belief, for it omits all reference to mental or spiritual reality. "The real universe," he says, "consists of the space-time system of existents, together with all that is presupposed by that system."⁹

Plato's conception of the Good as the highest reality is so well-known, so original, and so important that it must be noted here. Far from relegating good to a secondary place or even farther down the scale of reality, Plato declared that¹⁰

the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge in all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.

The Good, then, is more real than essences (Ideas), which are the usually considered basis of his idealism. The Good is the cause of all kinds of being. It informs or infuses the world as a whole with purpose, and gives it a goal (perfection) at which to aim.¹¹ The main point is that the world has a purpose; it is no mere blind striving, no collection of brute facts, nor senseless process.

8. See Dewey, EN, 405ff.; cf. above, 82.

9. Montague, art.(1912), 255; quoted Garnett, RV, 109.

10. Plato, Rep., 509; cf. Royce, WI, I, 190.

11. Demos, PP, 66; see Plato, Tim., 33b.

Demos describes what Plato means:¹²

In nature the Good is striven for but never to be attained. But, since it may be striven for, the Good is immanent in nature. The Good is the summit of all being, the idea which is beyond all other ideas; it is also the defining principle of all being.

.....
It the Good is not only the defining principle of ethics; it is the basic notion in ontology, in theory of knowledge, in the arts, and in theology. It is the most fundamental of the metaphysical factors; all the other metaphysical factors are subordinate to the Good.

Plato's Good is both a pre-existing form and an absolute end, an abstract, impersonal, unchanging perfection, the same for all races and generations. All phenomenal existence comes short of it, but is moved or affected by it. The Good is the ultimate in the scale of reality and the highest in the order of rationality and truth, even while the finite mind, tangled as it is in physical existence, cannot adequately grasp it.

The conviction that rational goods and reality coincide is not so much a result of proof as it is of faith. It is a working hypothesis. Evidence which favors the judgment that they coincide can be presented, and to do this is what is proposed for this chapter. In order to get under way, the distinction between instrumental values and goods and intrinsic should again be set forth.

3. Intrinsic and instrumental goods

In the scale of values and goods it is often possible

12. First half of quotation is from Demos, PP, 71; the second half from same source, 76.

to make a cleavage between the items which are valued for their own sake and which are good in their own right, and other items which are valued for their utility or instrumental character. For example, there are some intrinsic goods (such as truth, beauty, purity, personality, good will) which ought to be liked for what they are: the culmination, the highest expression, the most effective concept, or the most poignant insight in a whole system of ideas. Then there are other goods which ought to be liked because they make such a culmination, expression, concept, or insight possible. Probably no intrinsic good is merely intrinsic, and no instrumental good is that and nothing else, for there is a mutual interdependence between goods which does not permit them to stand alone, except that they may be isolated in thought. But in so far as a good is intrinsic, it stands higher in the scale of reality. Values of either kind are more or less indifferent to objective truth; they may be highly prized regardless of the marks of reality which they do or do not possess. But the recognition of true enduring values (goods) represents the highest understanding which finite minds can have--the concept of what ought to be liked for its own sake.

4. Values and goods on the practical plane

are instrumental

On the practical, common-sense plane, the tendency of human beings is to accept instrumental and intrinsic val-

ues alike as real goods. All kinds of pleasure are desired, and the natural bent of uncritical reason is to say that what is liked ought to be liked, that the status quo is the most desirable state of affairs. In this case common sense would say that pleasure ought to be sought everywhere and at all times. Familiarity, habitual, constant contact with, and affection for objects of daily use may blind anyone to their really extrinsic nature. They tend to become synonymous with the real. Professor Hocking describes the formation of the bias thus:¹³

Our occupations always define for us some aspect of reality; whatever we are daily occupied with and can deal with successfully, making it respond to our wills,--that we regard as real. To the banker, the flimsy figures on his account sheets represent realities; to the artist, his colors and the things of beauty he can produce with them: and these may or may not seem to the banker as unreal as the abstractions of financial credit to the artist. But there is one universal occupation, the occupation with physical things, place and motion, food and shelter, physical labor which fortunately no one escapes.

It is thus that men come to regard certain values as final and to link them with the real, while the ought-to-be-liked, as a more spiritual and intangible fact, appears to be an unreal abstraction. Long contact with the physical environment blurs out the vision of the good, while an untempered conception of reality as material becomes welded to the values (the merely liked) in the furnace of daily experience.

13. Hocking, TP, 47.

Like most common-sense ideas, this way of taking value-experience leads to contradictions. With its attention fastened upon the immediate interest, common sense fails to apprehend the more remote inconsistencies which appear to maturer experience, to reflection. To pursue the object which is immediately liked is often to pursue a phantom, while paradoxically, what one really wanted eludes him. Uncritical common sense experiences this disappointment again and again. Values taken with no reference to the rational ought-to-be-liked lead to conflict and chaos in the life of the person who so takes them. An organizing principle to keep values in proper relation and perspective is a requirement of the good life.

5. Values and goods on the theoretical plane

Some inkling of the confusion on the theoretical plane concerning the relation of values and goods to the real can be gleaned by noting the opinions of a number of modern thinkers.¹⁴ The disagreements among them might well cause a novitiate to throw up his hands in despair and renounce the rational good as nothing more than a wish or a dream.¹⁵ At best goods are ideals which can be realized under favorable conditions. At worst, an ideal represents

14. Cf. Ayer, LTL, 17, 172; Alexander, STD, II, 243-245; Dewey, EN, 28, 405, 415-416; Leighton, MC, 340, 406, 408, 411; Sorley, MVIG, 91, 93, 140, 141, 233; Perry, GTV, 115; Russell, WIB, 22; Spaulding, WOC, v; Urban, IW, 61, 65.

15. Cf. Gerard, art.(Jan. 1942), 98.

an impossible height of perfection which human beings cannot fully realize, or realize at all in the world as it now exists. Such an ideal is not real because it is not objective, public and enduring; and it is doubtful, even in spite of the fact that some people cling to such ideals, that they can rightly be called goods (what ought to be liked). The position for this dissertation is that some ideals are genuine objective goods which have a valid claim upon all persons because of their rational and persistent character, and their possibility of adequate realization.¹⁶

6. Arguments for the objective reality of good

i. Urban. What is the nature of the arguments that are used to establish the objectivity and the reality of goods (or values, as some writers understand the term)? Urban writes that the "natural metaphysic of the human mind," the result of the basic constitution of human beings in an environment like the present world, is to see the good and the real as one, as an ultimate monism.¹⁷

We find reality intolerable without raising it to the sphere of value, but we find it equally difficult to think value without its implying some kind of reality, and without giving it some form of being.

ii. Köhler. Köhler speaks of something similar. The conviction that values are in large measure objective is well-nigh universal. "If the contrary is true should not

16. See Chapter One, 16.

17. Urban, IW, 130.

practically all mankind be able to see it?" he asks.¹⁸ It would seem that the present zest and initiative of human beings in the quest of goods and values would disappear if the conviction of their objective reference or status were to be dissipated.

iii. Alexander. Alexander bases the objectivity of good upon its enduring quality, and in the coherence of the objects to which it attaches. An excerpt of his metaphysical view may be used for description:¹⁹

For goodness, whether we are considering the human values or the subhuman values, is the character of the permanent as opposed to the impermanent contrasted evil. The universe works in experience so as to secure the survival of good, or rather that which survives in the long run in the contest establishes its value thereby and is good. To repeat a saying already quoted, "morality is the nature of things."

iv. Pringle-Pattison. Pringle-Pattison argues that values²⁰ must be objective because of the meaning or nature of ideals for men in general.²¹

Ideals would be impossible to a self-contained finite entity. To frame an ideal and pursue it means the presence of the infinite in the finite experience; or, from the other side, it is the mark of the finite being who is to partake in an infinite life. All claims, therefore, made on man's behalf, must be based on the objectivity of the values revealed in his experience, and brokenly realized there. Man does not make values any more than he makes reality.

18. Köhler, PVWF, 77.

19. Alexander, STD, II, 413; cf. 243.

20. Many authors use "values" in the sense that "good" is used here.

21. Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 238-239.

v. Other arguments. There are other grounds for belief in the objectivity of goods based upon the belief that there is an objective reason or mind which is expressed in forms, structure, law, universals, uniformity, and system. No one will seriously deny the presence of these factors in to world to some extent, but that they indicate the operation of an infinite mind is of **course not universally accepted**.²² Metaphysicians may well ask with Taylor:

Is the 'world' as a whole the embodiment of a definite rational plan or structure, or is its very ground-plan something which, like the successive sensible 'events', is always unfinished and 'provisional'? Is the plan on which the world is constructed, so to say, subject to indefinite revision?

The facts point in both directions. Yet it does not seem that the world-plan is, in its broad outlines, subject to revision. Many details appear bound by an almost negligible necessity, in comparison with the validity of the laws and broad principles which seem so definitely established. A scientist writes:²³

The induction that nature is reasonable has been so fortified by the crescendo of objective evidence that it has become a law of experience, and scientists have the same faith in the ubiquity of uniformity as have all men in the regular rising of the sun.

Since the essential nature of reason is to be purposive,²⁴ to speak of nature as "reasonable" would seem to

22. Taylor, CPT, 71.

23. Gerard, art.(Jan. 1942), 96.

24. See above, Chapter One, 24ff.

indicate that signs of purpose can be discerned therein; that the connections in the world are the work of a mind. That the good is rational and vice-versa was the chief proposition of Chapter Three; if this be granted, then a reasonable or intelligible world is a good world.

If the world were simply a cumulation or succession of disconnected facts or events without value, it would be difficult to see how any predictions could be made which would occur as predicted, unless occasionally a lucky guess might coincide with some part of the flux of events. There must be some kind of co-operation and co-ordination between reality and realizers in order for knowledge to be possible. Pringle-Pattison writes and quotes from Balfour a lucid expression of this requirement:²⁵

If the general system of scientific beliefs is to be accepted as rational--which is the contention of Naturalism and also the assumption of commonsense--it must be because 'we bring to the study of the world the pre-supposition that it is the work of a rational Being, who made it intelligible, and at the same time made us, in however feeble a fashion, able to understand it.'

The conviction that good is objective is a corollary of the belief in a benevolent world-purpose, because purpose is meaningless unless there is an objective end to be gained which is conceived of as good. Arguments for purpose are practically innumerable. A few samples should bring to light much of the evidence that is offered by the

25. Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 61; he quotes Balfour, FOB, 282; cf. 296, 301.

exponents of the idea.

vi. Plato. One of Plato's arguments was based on a reduction to absurdity. It is ridiculous to argue that the world was not purposed and planned. How could earth, air, fire, and water, without any dynamic and intelligent principle of organization, cause all the various intelligible forms of experience now present in the world?²⁶ He makes use of the teleological and cosmological arguments, basing the case upon the analogy of a finite mind and its products to a mind which has molded existing things after an eternal model.²⁷

vii. Lotze. Lotze was convinced that forms do not arrive by accident. The efficient and formal causes of things must be bound up in one unit with their final cause, for²⁸

we cannot regard Nature as a kaleidoscope that, shaken by chance, produces forms that look as if they had a meaning; if there is to be any meaning in this meaning, we must seriously assume and hold fast the conviction that the same power whence proceed the efficient capabilities of things, also directly includes the moulding imagination which assigns to these capabilities their points of application and their significant lines.

Mechanism cannot be the sole explanatory principle, he argues, because nature favors the rational, and tends to expel what

26. See Plato, Phaedo, 97-99.

27. See Plato, Tim., 29ff.

28. Lotze, MIC, 411.

is irrational. Numerous benefits and requirements of life on the earth are produced by nature through its inner harmony of parts. He asks:²⁹

How could mechanical Nature--which must be contented with all that satisfies its universal laws--be the source of this superfluous perfection?

viii. Bowne. Borden P. Bowne argued that determinism and necessity or the alternative chance would involve men in speculative disaster; for that reason these explanatory methods must be curbed or discarded.³⁰ If man's thinking is necessitated it is meaningless. It is not meaningless, therefore it is not necessitated. But if it is not necessitated then novelty and freedom exist in the world. Wherever novelty and freedom exist in the absence of lawless irrationality, there must be some kind of benevolent purposive control. Thus the idea of a governing agency which operates throughout the whole world is arrived at, and all reality is united by a common bond.

ix. Leighton. Two arguments used by Leighton are interesting. In one he suggests that purposiveness is a mark of incompleteness, of imperfection, and end not yet reached. Complete mechanical operation is perfect; thus engineers speak of the perfection of a motor, a locomotive, or other machine. But nature is always apparently falling short

29. Lotze, MIC, 429.

30. Bowne, TTK, 365. The argument is slightly embellished.

of perfection, although seeming to aim at a mark. This activity without perfection implies the incomplete reign of mechanism, and the presence of a purpose which aims at the good.³¹

His other argument follows the line of thought that man's progress has in it more of good than men themselves have contributed to it. There is a perceptible direction of human development which is neither the result of conscious human planning nor of chance. He supports this by the following idea from Bosanquet:³²

It is not finite consciousness that has planned the great phases of civilization, which are achieved by the linking of finite minds on the essential basis of the geological structure of the globe. Each separate mind reaches but a little way, and relatively to the whole of a movement must count as unconscious. You may say that there is intelligence in every step of the connection; but you cannot claim as a design of finite intelligence what never presented itself in that character to any single mind.

x. Gilson. To those scientists who charge that the belief in a benevolent purpose (or any purpose) in nature is merely a projection of our own ideas into it, Gilson replies:³³

We do not need to project our own ideas into the economy of nature; they belong there in their own right. Our own ideas are in the economy of nature because we ourselves are in it.

.....
Through man, who is part and parcel of nature, purposive-

31. Leighton, MC, 208. Slightly embellished.

32. Bosanquet, PIV, 154-155; in Leighton, MC, 211.

33. Gilson, GP, 133-134.

ness most certainly is part and parcel of nature. In what sense then is it arbitrary, knowing from within that where there is organization there is always a purpose, to conclude that there is a purpose wherever there is organization?

xi. Results of the arguments. These then are some of the arguments that have been advanced to justify the belief in benevolent purpose in the objective world. They are some of the simpler, less complicated arguments. In the final analysis, one must have a comprehension of the nature of the world as throughout mental in order to see that it could not be what it is and still lack purposiveness. Those with the scientific bias may be willing to live "in a world of mere appearances, where that which appears is the appearance of nothing,"³⁴ and they may regard the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" as meaningless; but they take their stand on "notions of blind force, chance, emergence, sudden variation" for the reason that "they much prefer a complete absence of intelligibility to the presence of a nonscientific intelligibility."³⁵ They are unwilling to accept as plausible any kind of purposive evaluation or explanation, or to acknowledge that cosmic facts, events, and structure are what they are because their particular mode of being is better than some other. This seems arbitrary and irrational--it is the adherence to the strict

34. Gilson, GP, 132.

35. Ibid., 130.

application of a method to the point of fanaticism.

7. The meaning and place of evil

If benevolent purpose is an objective fact in the world then there is a good which is an objective reality. For purpose which has no direction is nothing but a blind urge or will, and can be neither benevolent nor rational. This necessary union of benevolence and purpose is usually brought together or consummated in the concept of God, and will be considered presently in this chapter. But first let these questions be considered: what shall be done with the facts of particularity, novelty, mechanical operation, interruptions of process, and destructions of values in the world, all of which facts at times wear the outward appearance, at least, of evil? Do they point to the presence of evil purposes? Are they objectively real evils? Do they refute the idea of a rational good?³⁶

In general the explanations move in two directions. One explanation makes the evil or irrational aspects of the world merely apparent or phenomenal. The other pictures irrationality and evil as an established aspect of the real, fully as objective and enduring as the good. The issues tend to become somewhat beclouded; the Hegelians acknowledge evil, but not "real" evil, while the realists insist upon

36. These questions are answered specifically below, page 119.

remaining optimists in a world where evil remains as a permanent, untransmuted fact.³⁷

Evil depends for some of its unpleasant effect upon its relation to time. It is obvious that in a world where situations change, the evil of "now" may well be the good of a later period. But as long as the evil does appear now, it is difficult for the finite mind to see it as part of the eternal purpose of a benevolent mind. Nevertheless, even finite minds may attain to some notion of the way in which evil might be taken as an instrumental good. Reason requires irrational materials in order to be kept busy.³⁸

Without some opposition, some antithetical other, it could have no task. Without evils there could be no idea of good, because there would be no criteria by which to recognize it. If there were no evils, rational minds could will no change, for there could be nothing to change from or to. Time would disappear if there were no change, for time is essentially of the nature of change. Benevolent purpose could have no further place in an economy of complete good, for all possible good ends would already have been realized. Thus a world in which there is resistance to reason without the result that reason is completely frustrated, is both good and rational. That is the kind of world that actually exists.

37. See Bradley, AP, 411; Spaulding, WAI, 255; Hocking, TP, 354, where he quotes Spaulding; also Hocking, TP, 372-375.

38. Santayana, LOR, 196.

Mankind seems almost incurably committed to optimism because of it. The belief is practically universal that more and more of the problems that men face will be mastered. Many of those who would renounce any belief in a benevolent, rational world-purpose would be the first to insist upon this possibility of making the human lot a better, happier one. Such a combination of hopelessness with optimism seems inconsistent.

Evil is an overpowering fact only as one forgets the whole in which it appears. It is a bitter fact of the momentary present, but is impermanent--"it will not always be so." When it is carefully considered in a wider context than immediate experience (and it must be admitted that to view it thus when personal tragedies come is extremely difficult), evil becomes transmuted and presents a different appearance.

Evil appears because the human ideal of perfection is contrasted with existing circumstances which are admittedly not perfect. The power to grasp ideals lures human aspirations on from the particularity of facts to the generality of goods and values. Ideals direct the attention away from the irrationality of much of nature to the complete intelligibility which they possess. Chance and unpredictability give way to the hope of certainty in the mind which forms concepts of the ideal; the apparent purposelessness of the world becomes the reality of a precise realiza-

tion of a benevolent purpose; and the immediate persuasion that evil is a reality to the perception that in the supposed evil there is the possibility of advance to still greater goods. The infinite in the finite, the eternal in the temporal, the front stage and the background of life--it is the perception of the contrast between these that gives rise to the idea of evil. It is an idea which plagues mankind, yet if men can but get the total view, evil helps to make actual the infinite possible goods of individual personalities.

In the whole situation of good and evil the most amazing fact is the ability of men to endure and rally under adverse circumstances. The first and most important battle of the whole struggle occurs within the unity of each individual personality; the battle to understand, to adjust, and finally to alter the offending facts. It is by this that personality develops out of its beginning as a "blooming, buzzing confusion" (to borrow James' phrase) into a coherent whole. And as will be shown later, the creating and molding of rational and unified personalities appears to be the ultimate end of the world that now is--"the last of life, for which the first was made."³⁹

8. Summary of the preceding section

In order to summarize this section, the questions pro-

39. Browning, Rabbi Ben Ezra.

posed above⁴⁰ may be answered briefly. The facts of the world which are called evil may be explained as really instrumental goods (so long as they do not arise from finite wills), or facts capable of being used for self-development by rational minds. They do not necessarily point to evil world-purposes but to good purposes, since struggle against opposition is the only way higher good and greater perfection can come out of the less perfect. These evils may be said to be real in the sense that they arise from a comparison of the ought-to-be-liked (which is real) with the state of things as they are; but they are not real in the sense of being permanent. There is no rational mind to will their continued existence. Finally, they do not refute the idea of a rational, objective good, but rather strengthen it, since they are employed by a rational mind and minds to realize the good, to set the course in the direction of the ought-to-be-liked.

9. The mode of the objective existence of good

Although a reasonable presumption of the objectivity and enduring character of good has been established, the manner or mode of its being has not yet been determined. In Chapter One it was asserted⁴¹ that rational purposes and

40. See page 115.

41. See page 23.

anything that fulfils rational purposes may be said to be good. Since rational purposes do not accidentally occur, but in experience are found only in the minds of persons, it follows that personality or a person is the locus of the greatest potentiality for good. Höffding says:⁴²

In our experience personal beings appear in existence as centres of value, by which I mean as the living central points in which value can be felt and acknowledged. It is personality which in the world of our experience invests all other things with value. . . . The inhibition of a centre of value must necessarily involve a decrease of value.

i. Good is not a hypostatized abstraction. Thus the rational purposes, the good will, are not something apart from personal beings. The trend of philosophy is happily away from the hypostatizing of abstractions. Goods are not held to be objective in the sense of their being independent existences apart from other reality; they have their character precisely because they are bound up with the most permanent and self-identical essence known--personality. Values or goods have no "sort of ineffable and mysterious reality."⁴³

ii. Good exists concretely in personality. Brightman iterates the necessity for a view of good (or true value) as concrete.⁴⁴ "Value is an abstraction, a mere essence,

42. Höffding, POR, 279.

43. Leighton, ISO, 340.

44. Brightman, IPKI, 36.

apart from its existence in personality; and no metaphysic of value is complete without a metaphysic of personality." Elsewhere he writes in similar vein:⁴⁵

Personalism holds . . . that a value which does not exist is, as nonexistent, no value at all, and that the value of a value consists in some type of actual or possible embodiment in personal life, finite or infinite. Without existence, no value. Without personality, no existence.

It was said above⁴⁶ that in the final analysis, one must understand the world as being throughout mental in order to see that purposiveness is part of its essential nature. It is thought in the world structure that keeps its ordered, furnishes the efficient causes, resists the irrational, unintelligent drift toward disintegration and chaos. It is the kind of thought that is found in personality. Personality is far from being one of the last products of nature--rather the reverse seems more nearly true. It seems unintelligible to say that nature had no cause or beginning, far more so than to say that God had none. For if God be conceived to be a person, the analogy of human personality possessing self-activity and self-maintenance powers gives at least some clue to the nature of a self-identical, self-sustaining first cause. It has been said that nature is running down, that the available heat is being diffused, that in some billions of years the conditions will no long-

45. Brightman, POI, 190.

46. See page 114.

er be present to sustain life. If nature is running down, the question pressing upon the minds of many is, who has wound it up? What nature seems unable to do for itself calls for the idea of an adequate cause.

But aside from this, to say that nature is uncaused is unintelligible for these reasons: The assertion is unsatisfactory because it discards the ordinary mode of explanation; that is, it abandons the scientific mode of explanation by reference to causal antecedents. Being a negative proposition, it fails to tielid any fruitful hypotheses. Further, to speak of structure, law, order, and system as evolving on either a small scale or large without some kind of active agent seems to lack meaning. If there is neither an immanent purpose or nisus in nature nor an external agency dealing with it from its inception, the fact of its being a universe seems unaccountable.

Neither truth nor error, good nor value exists without minds which purpose and appraise. "The only thing that is of absolute value is the individual person's experience, since this is the only realizer, enjoyer, and bearer of values."⁴⁷ This is a "down to the earth" fact which must commend itself to minds which require something definite to which they may cling.

Let it be supposed that the statement opening the

47. Leighton, ISO, 340.

preceding paragraph is false. It would still remain true that all values and goods and the factors of individual growth and development are significant only by their reference to mind or minds. Character develops by the continuous reasoned incorporation of the better and the best into one's personal life. Leighton expresses it excellently:⁴⁸

We human selves discover values and in their realization become persons and thereby become richer and more harmonious finite embodiments of the meaningful and worthwhile life of the universe. . . . For the deepest quality in man, that which makes him a person or spirit in becoming, is the capacity to transcend his natural or biological selfhood and to take on more universal and richer spiritual quality. Man is essentially a God-seeker, one who can become divine. This destiny of spiritual progress through self-transcendence is the deepest word of the greatest human thinkers. . . . So too the doctrine of the union of the individual soul with the universal soul; Plato's doctrine of the good; Aristotle's contemplative life; the Stoic life in harmony with the logos; the mystic's contemplative and ecstatic union with the one. Through these and other one-sided or partial expressions of the same principle there shines one fundamental truth--the absolute principle of value, the objective ground of all value is personality, spiritual selfhood in widest commonalty spread.

This point of view is held by philosophers who differ widely on other fundamental points. For example, McTaggart argues that "only the spiritual can have value," but as an atheist he says that the universe, which in other explanations would be the experience of God, has no value, although its parts (selves) do have. In fact, selves are the locus of all value--they are intrinsic goods, and

48. Leighton, MC, 410; see also 406-407.

other goods are called utilities.⁴⁹

W.R. Sorley expresses his opinions in a way which seems adequately to summarize the main ideas of this section. He believes that value resides in persons by virtue of the fact that they are individuals, and as such unique. "Given existence, value is always possible; it attaches itself to uniqueness only because it is the individual that exists, and the individual is always unique."⁵⁰ He quotes T.H. Green to the effect that personal worth is our ultimate standard in the category of good, a standard in relation to which all other values are relative.⁵¹ His belief that the good is rational, real, and in persons appears in these words:⁵²

As free and rational, persons are also purposeful, seekers of ends. The law which the person recognizes as valid for his life is that which tends to be the end in which personality is conceived as reaching its true good. This is an ideal, and its attainment must be looked for in the gradual process by which character is built up and conduct brought into rational order. The moral agent is thus compelled to regard his true personality as consisting not in the actual features of the passing moment but in an is to be--in something to which he should attain and to which he can at least approximate.

10. The good and God

On the finite plane reason and good (and value) are included within the microcosmic unity of personal life. Are

49. McTaggart, NOE, II, 398, 399, 404.

50. Sorley, MVIG, 115.

51. Ibid., 122-123.

52. Ibid., 190.

they also ultimately identical with the macrocosm? Since the world conforms more or less readily to the persuasion of intelligent plans of action, since it favors rational ends and is apparently under the influence and direction of ends, it must be a unity of experience for some kind of mind capable of grasping it as a whole. This seems to be necessary, for without rational direction, it is difficult to see how such a rational character and continuity of direction could be true of the universe so steadily as is the case. All the mechanical systems which mankind knows definitely require constant thought and attention to keep them at peak operating capacity and perfection. Therefore the world requires the constant and immediate oversight of an infinite mind.

This is a tremendous venture of analogical reasoning, one whose bases and implications will occupy the remainder of the present chapter. The question of the ultimate objectivity of the rational good depends upon the disposition of the problem of an infinite mind.

Proofs for the existence of God need not be produced here. For the most of mankind, such proof affects the belief but little; men depend more upon faith and pragmatic consequences than upon intellectual demonstration. The stock arguments, the ontological, cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments, are fairly familiar and can be found in numerous textbooks of philosophy and theology.

The gist of all arguments is that there must be a rational ground of the world's existence, its interaction of parts, and its purposive operation. The denial of any explanatory principle, such as cause, agency, or purpose, or other categories and empirical facts, detracts both from simple intelligibility and from mental satisfaction. If human minds at the present advanced stage of the world's progress cannot produce phenomena like those of nature, or even reproduce them adequately when given a pattern to work from, how could nature have been produced by a finite mind or minds at an earlier stage of history? And as the world now exists, how could its mechanical parts interact so precisely, carry on as if under direction, and maintain themselves without breakdown or apparent deterioration, unless there were a single unitary agent in control of them?⁵³ Further, according to the scientific doctrine of evolution, the survival of a belief strongly suggests its truth and validity, and certainly theism has outlived many perilous periods in the history of thought and religion.

11. God's nature and relation to the world

Four main conceptions of the nature of God have been developed to account for the intelligible character of the world. The first to be discussed here is pantheism. In this view, as is well-known, God is regarded as wholly immanent

53. Bowne, THE, 51-63. This is the gist of his argument.

in the world. Extreme pantheism is a conception in which every particular fact is identified with God. God is dissolved, as it were, in an ocean of particularity, in which he is indistinguishable from any particular--no predicate can adequately describe him. If everything is a manifestation of God, then everything partakes of his nature. Everything is good, and evil has no reality whatever.

Pantheism is such an all-inclusive conception, so entirely without an alter that to most persons it lacks meaning. The views of some of the most important philosophers⁵⁴ have had a more or less pantheistic flavor, but are far more moderate than some others which can be positively identified as pantheisms.⁵⁵

The method of obtaining the unity which an intelligible metaphysical theory demands, of identifying everything with God has produced some masterpieces of ingenuity and dialectical intricacy. Many of them bear a winning plausibility. Yet somehow one sees and feels that absolutes, because they are not thinking and willing beings, but merely universal concepts which must contain everything that is, fall short of accounting for and unifying the diversity, novelty, evil, and other irrationalities of the physical

54. For example, Hegel, Bradley, Royce.

55. Philosophic Hinduism, Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, Spinozism.

and moral universe. No matter what concepts are brought forth to explain the multiplicity of particular empirical facts, the explanation must be an inadequate one if God or the Absolute is not granted active intelligence and will. "Metaphysics," said Bowne, "shows that active intelligence alone fills out the true notion of being, unity, identity, and causality."⁵⁶ Unless God is an active mind, he cannot be a significant factor in the world's processes, and the apparent purpose in the world remains an ungrounded phenomenon.

Deism is the second view of God's relation to the world which is offered to reduce the facts to some kind of intelligibility. It is at the farthest extreme from pantheism. The term "deism" is usually used to refer to the religious rationalists and the advocates of natural as opposed to revealed religion in the eighteenth century, particularly in England, where, as shallow as it was, it had more depth than in some other countries, e.g., France. One characteristic doctrine of deism in all countries was the notion that God is far removed from the world-order.⁵⁷ The world is mechanical; although God probably created it, he is both external to it and remote from it (i.e. wholly transcendent in relation to it). God may be personal on this

56. Bowne, THE, 140.

57. Rogers, SHP, 391.

view, but he is wholly unconcerned about his creation. In spite of its vogue in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries deism was too superficial to win the support of able men. A religion which operates only by an uninspired reason, and a deity who serves only as creator have too little appeal either to become or to remain vital influences. The manifestation of purpose in the world is unintelligible if the world is mechanical. Growth, development, and progress cannot have meaning if only the reign of law is to make them possible. The modification of one law by another (e.g. the expansion and increased buoyancy of water as it arrives at the freezing point), seems difficult to conceive on the mechanical plane.

The view of Aristotle is in some ways intermediary between the deistic and pantheistic views, but has some features also which distinguish it from both of them. Terms which might fittingly be applied to his conception of God are the "logical absolute" or the "ultimate abstract universal." For him God is pure form, wholly inactive and incorporeal, the highest object of pure thought and contemplation. How God can move the world becomes a problem; Aristotle argues that the desire of finite existence for the ideal which God is, is the impelling power in all motion, in all growth and development. God is only a final,

and not an efficient cause. He is the entelechy, the realization for which the whole world strives. But Aristotle's view of him is abstract, a projection from the finite hierarchy of form and matter on the ascending scale.⁵⁹

The truth of this view is that forms or universals do bear the load of intelligibility for the world. The case rests upon this basis: "If there are genuine universals, the universe is rational; as someone has said it is 'put together mindwise.'"⁶⁰ This much is fact: men think by means of universals, and the world accommodates itself to this method. The question upon which most disagreement develops is: what kind of universals? Aristotle's abstract universal is not in general favor at the present time.

The falsity of this view lies in its supposal that God has any significant connection with the world, considering the fact that he is pure form, a mind without activity. Form and matter separated from each other are empty abstractions--even Aristotle saw how little could be said about them. It was Plato's separation of them which he criticized and which he intended to overcome by his own view, although as has been seen, he did not wholly succeed. Form and matter are never experienced singly, hence for Aristotle to call God pure form is to make God an unknow-

59. Aristotle, *Met.*, IX, 6, 994a, 1049a, b; cf. Rogers, *SHP*, 102-107.

60. Brightman, *ITP*, 133.

able entity. The criticism which Leighton directs against those who try to avoid the concrete metaphysics of personality by having recourse to a 'transcendental ought' seems to have relevancy when applied to the view of Aristotle.⁶¹

To set up such a notion is an intellectually vicious abstractionism, of the same order as that which would ground all the reality, worth of personal life, in a 'consciousness in general' (Bewusstsein überhaupt).

Aristotle maintains with the deists the objectivity of God, but God is so far from any effective relationship with the rest of reality that his function is not fully intelligible.

The fourth view of God formulated to explain the intelligible and benevolent aspects of the world is personalistic and theistic. This conception of the nature of God is offered as a true synthesis of the views which make God an empty generality on the one hand and a meaningless universal inclusion of all facts on the other. In this view God is regarded as both immanent and transcendent, as a mover, purposer, and sustainer of the universe. Rashdall describes the motive and spirit of this position:⁶²

I will simply state that to my own mind the only form in which belief in the rationality of the universe is intelligible is the form which ascribes the events of its history to a self-conscious rational Will directing itself towards an end which presents itself to Him as absolutely good. However inadequate our conceptions

61. Leighton, MC, 408.

62. Rashdall, TGE, II, 214.

of 'Will', 'Mind', 'Purpose', 'Reason', 'Personality', may be to express the nature of such a Being, they are the best we have. Thought does not become more adequate by becoming vaguer.

There are several formulations of the personalistic position; in all, as the name implies, the highest reality is the fact of personality, individual, unique, active, and intelligent. In the system propounded by Bowne, God is conceived as a person under whose direction the world moves at all times.⁶³ Bowne writes:⁶⁴

Both laws and things exist or change solely because of the demands of the divine plan. If this calls for fixedness, they are fixed; if it calls for change, they change. They have in themselves no ground of existence so as to be a limit for God; because they are nothing but the divine purpose flowing forth into realization. . . . We hold that the world is no self-centred reality, independent of God, but is simply the form in which the divine purpose realizes itself.

Bowne consciously strives to avoid the extremes of both the deistic and the pantheistic views.⁶⁵ In his opinion the only possible way to accomplish this is on the plane of personality. The features of the world which force one to the conclusion that God is a person are these: (1) the world of interacting things requires an underlying ground of interaction which is effective at all points. (2) It is

63. God as personal was advocated by Plato; has been the Christian tradition held by the church fathers, many of the scholastic thinkers, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Kant, Lotze, Eucken, Green, Sorley, Green, Howison, Balfour, Ward, Pringle-Pattison, Rashdall, and the Personalists, Knudson, Brightman, Flewelling, as well as many others. See Knudson, PP, 32-33.

64. Bowne, THE, 227-228.

65. Ibid., 227.

an intelligible system⁶⁶ which requires an intelligent originator--the opposite view is contrary to reason.⁶⁷ But "many have held that the world-ground is intelligent and rational but not personal."⁶⁸ This is contradiction; active intelligence is what is meant by personality or personhood.⁶⁹

The universe of experience has no meaning or possibility apart from conscious intelligence as its abiding source or seat. . . . Living, personal intelligence is the only possible first.

This is but one of the numerous metaphysical paths which lead to the same conclusion. "Identity, unity, causality, substantiality are possible only under the personal form."⁷⁰ Everything impersonal is dependent and phenomenal and of the nature of instrumental good.

With the idea that the co-ordinated action of the universe can take place mechanically, with only the moving power of impersonal causal antecedents to bring events about, it is difficult to have patience. On the impersonal plane, theorizers are given to assuming tacitly what they never admit explicitly. Thus the following, quoted by Pringle-Pattison from A.E. Taylor: "'The succession of stages is welded into a unity by the singleness of the plan or law which they embody."⁷¹

66. Bowne, THE, 51-53.

67. Ibid., 69-70, 151.

68. Ibid., 155.

69. Ibid., 169; see also 168.

70. Ibid., 204.

71. Taylor, EOM, 162-163; Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 360.

Now a plan or law can weld nothing. Of course one must make allowances for the modes of expression which, although inadequate to express the thought, are yet made necessary by the shortcomings of language. However, this mode of expression is typical of a considerable number of philosophers who import dynamism into their systems of thought surreptitiously, without recognizing frankly and fairly that something more than order, system, intelligibility, a group of categories, and a physical world are needed to account for the unity that are actually experienced. The only original dynamism that men experience lies within their own personalities,--they initiate events, begin activities. Any other self-starting activity cannot be intelligible to them, except on this basis.

Most learned men, particularly those with scientific training, look for mechanical causes, and are wont to overlook the fact that mechanical operation has no sufficient ultimate explanation within its own realm. They are content to rest in the immediate chain of causes and effects, and to ignore the ultimate cause.

No one need complain of this procedure so long as those who use it do not go beyond their prerogatives to deny that there are ultimate explanations and goods, or to affirm that there is no other explanation possible than mechanical explanation. But when philosophers, either through timidity or carelessness, fall into the same error, and re-

main within the one limited realm of explanation, while still importing the necessary motive power and motion for the scheme of things, then an outcry must be raised. When science is able to prove that anything of a strictly mechanical nature is self-preserving in the same sense that living organisms are, then philosophy may cease to look for ultimate sources of power, because a nature that is self-sustaining could then be conceived as having no beginning. Until then, the most logical and reasonable possibility for ultimate reference is a personality of the same order as human personality, a prototype of human personality. This is the natural and most satisfactory ultimate explanation for human thinking.

12. The outcome of the view of God as personal for the rational good

It was said above that personality is the bearer of value, the realizer of value, and is itself the highest of values or goods.⁷² In short, it is the only intrinsic good; that is, whatever intrinsic goods may be distinguished reside in personality. Therefore the Supreme Person is the summum bonum, the highest good of all. In him reality and all worth become identical; the proposition of the "Great Tradition" coheres with personalistic principles.

God's supremacy and perfection do not mean that he

72. See above, 122.

has no occupation, no task, no activity. Self-activity is a conspicuous fact in all personality, and there is no reason to suppose that the personality of God is any exception. The mirror-like intelligence of Aristotle's God cannot be the God who is in active relationship with the universe, a God who both knows and wills the good.

But if God is a rational mind under whose direction the world moves, does he will its unpleasant, painful, and discordant features? Is he the author of irrationality? God wills no intrinsic evil--one may be sure of that a priori, because he would no longer be God, but only a supreme tyrant. That is, if the Being who controls the universe wills contradictions of an intrinsic nature, then he is not God and the world is as senseless as the most extreme pessimist thinks it to be. The facts do not support this opinion. The direction of God's will is set unalterably toward the good which ought to be liked, but the coming of this good may be long deferred as mortals count time, although it will be deferred in the interests of the whole rational end. Extrinsic evils may be aids to this final good. The events and conditions that cause pain may well be caused or introduced by God. The patriarch Job thought so, and declared, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him."⁷³ "No chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous, but griev-

73. Job, Chap. 13:15. Cf. American Revision.

ous."⁷⁴ Even so, a world or a character which contains the maximum possible good seems to require the chastening which is called evil.

On the basis of reason it would be difficult to say that the world is good, even allowing that the evils are only apparent. Reason is perplexed by the question, why the appearance of evil? Considering the whole realm of the world as it is, its possibilities and the apparent divine purpose in it, one may say that it is the best God can make. From the finite viewpoint it is knotty and thorny, yet orderly and benevolent, and could be either better or worse than it is. It does serve a purpose (which may be the divine purpose); by making man toil and sweat it develops character and spiritual stamina, yields the satisfaction of progress, and prepares one so that he can enjoy a still more perfect world. If one's philosophy does not admit a realm of ends, this argument will be meaningless. Without ends, however, all arguments are finally meaningless. This unquestionably true of the individual argument itself--if it does not aim at truth, or at exercising the vocal cords, or at some other end, no matter how trivial, it is senseless. But in another sense even if the reasoning concerns particulars or immediate causes, if there is not something more ultimate to which it leads, these particulars or causes must of

74. Hebrews, Chap. 12:11.

necessity bear a limited and partially misleading meaning. Cut off from ends, they can only be described, not interpreted, and to the average man must seem barren and bleak in the long run. Ultimately every human thought is vanity if life is not moving toward an end that is full of meaning because full of the good.

What man calls imperfection, then, is for God but a tentative arrangement with a better end in view. This is proved only by the fact that such imperfection can be shown to serve the interests of reason and the good will. To some it may seem unnecessarily naïve, but the analogy of God to a parent who takes the long run viewpoint in providing for the welfare of his children seems a plausible notion. Discipline is an evil thing to a child, that is, from the observation point of a partial mind. However, if the characteristics of personality be the same in kind in man and in God, then God will not propose that man should have freedom from all trials. Rather, God will allow and ordain everything which will enable man to become an embodiment of the good, a rational will.

The fully rational good is not yet a reality in finite existence, but is a plan to be realized, an ideal. Men have good reason to hope and to exert themselves in its behalf. As Bowne expresses it:⁷⁵

75. Bowne, THE, 212.

The seeming evils and imperfections of the world being founded in purpose and freedom, and not in an intractable necessity, we are permitted to hope for their removal or transformation in the completion of the divine plan.

The outlines of the plan are clear to those who can read the signs--not that it is a rational certainty, but it is at least a rational probability that "a community of moral persons, obeying moral law and enjoying moral blessedness, is the only end that could excuse creation or make it worth while."⁷⁶ The conditions for this goal are present in the world, and men still have hope. The perfectly rational good is an ideal to urge man on to his fullest possible, and best possible self-realization; to his highest good, which is a personally achieved good. No good that could be given to a man would have such high value for him as that which he had a part in creating. Goods are only withheld, desires frustrated, and evils permitted, in the anticipation of greater ultimate gains. These gains in personality growth are the concrete realization of the rational good, the creation and enhancement of a rational will.

13. Summary of the chapter

This chapter began with the definition of reality and proceeded to show that the outstanding characteristic of the real is its capacity to keep its identity without contradiction while it is the object of coherent thought.

76. Bowne, *THE*, 231.

The good can measure up to this requirement for the real, especially if it is taken to be a good will concretely exemplified in personality. Without the latter, neither good nor value can be real. The natural human tendency to rest in what is liked without reference to the more enduring ought-to-be-liked was noted, along with the tendency to refer all values to an objective order. Evidence was presented to show that goods are objectively real--they are the key to the whole meaning of the universe. Purposiveness with a benevolent tinge marks the whole character of the world. From this purposiveness, by analogical reasoning, the existence of a Supreme Mind or Person is inferred. Evil, so-called, appears as undesirable because it represents the status of phenomenal existence against the background of perfection; perfection is a goal to be striven for--having by that plan a greater value--rather than to be conferred on a man without effort or desire on his part.

The pantheistic, deistic, and Aristotelian conceptions of God's relation to the world were shown to be inadequate to account for the experienced facts. A much more coherent and satisfactory account was shown to be the view of God as a personal, intelligent, and efficient mediator of the otherwise loosely-jointed world. The deepest truth about the divine being is its active participation in the realization of man's good; the fundamental truth about finite beings is what

they are capable of becoming.

In the following chapter, the implications of these conclusions for social progress will be investigated. How shall they be applied? What is social progress? What forms of social, political, and other kinds of organization contribute most to the development of individual personality and good will? Is individual development, after all, the thing most desirable, or is the desirable end a well-organized and unified state or society? These are the next questions awaiting attention.

CHAPTER V

THE RATIONAL GOOD AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

In the previous chapter, the conclusion was reached that the rational good is an ideal which becomes an objective reality in personality. In finite personality, it was said, the important fact is its capacity for becoming in one process more rational and ethically better. These ends are identical when the definition of rational adopted in Chapter One is accepted.¹ The background of the previous chapter for the present chapter is essential, because²

The source of the principle of the perfection of social man is to be found in the life and purposes of the cosmos. . . . The pattern and standard of moral worth is not to be found in man's nature alone, but in his environment, not merely of human society, but of the wider cosmos.

1. Definitions and viewpoints

In this final chapter the aim will be to discover how the ideal of the rational good may be realized in society as a whole, and what it will mean for society. Some of the questions to be considered are: (1) What is meant by "social"? (2) What is meant by "progress"? (3) What principles are involved in an adequate conception of social progress? (4) What do men who have thought carefully on the subject of social progress feel and say about it?

1. See above, pages 16-17.

2. Reid, art.(1926), 38-52; quoted in Leighton, ISO, 344.

(5) Should progress be attempted through individual training and culture, or through manipulation of the masses? (6) What fulfilled pre-conditions will make social advance possible?

"Social" is a term applied to the relationship of human beings in a common environment. If a man is out of contact and communication with other men, whatever relationships may obtain between him and them, they are not social. To say that a man is a social being means that he is capable of exchanging thoughts and ideas with other persons, and of participating in their emotions, aspirations, and life in general; but he actually has a social life only when such exchange and participation is taking place.

"Progress" is taken to mean change in the direction of an ideal end. Usually this does not mean wholly consistent, unhindered, or uninterrupted change for good; it means rather change for good on the whole. This is a widely inclusive definition which requires modification for more specific and significant meaning.

Social progress, then, may be taken to mean the increased and increasing interchange of ideas and participation in mutual interests between the geographically, politically, economically, and culturally separated groups of men that now populate the earth. Social progress will call for increasing knowledge and control of the facts in human environment which can bring about this increase of contact

and communication, and it will include the unwavering purpose to exercise control in behalf of the common good. Social progress refers to the relations of men to each other as they realize the good which their true nature as persons demands. Many variegated activities of men have social implications. The economic, political, scientific, and cultural pursuits of men may all contribute to their social progress.

It would be well to consider here in what light progress has been regarded before considering how the whole idea may be improved. The concept of progress is comparatively modern. Up to comparatively recent times (and the attitude is still strong in some quarters) those in places of leadership and authority were willing to "let well enough alone" as far as the social order was concerned. It has been considered "natural" for those in power to resist the coming of any kind of "new order" and to condemn the reforming spirit. The advice to mankind has been to endure patiently the ills it suffers rather than to fly to others it knows not of. Illustrations of the attitude may be found in the social systems of India and China, the "divine right" appeal of former monarchs, the totalitarian organization and spirit of some of the churches, and in certain capitalistic economic doctrines.

On the other hand, some restless, revolutionary souls have been convinced that radical means, the use of either

violent ideas or violent force, will bring about an order in which many of the present evils will be absent. Driven by the desire for economic security and the desire for adequate recognition of their essential dignity and humanity, they have resorted, where necessary, to the use of violence in order to achieve these ends.

2. Principles of social progress

The notion of social progress that is here considered to be satisfactory is one which has as its end the rational good of the preceding chapters, and one which is perhaps a mean between the concepts presented in the last two paragraphs. This notion involves the recognition of at least three principles. These are: (1) That progress is possible only on the plan of widest inclusion of facts, of continuous harmonization as new elements appear in the social milieu; (2) That progress is possible for society as a whole only as the rational good is realized in individual persons; and (3) That progress for society requires the intelligent guidance of individual persons--not merely to control each one by prohibitions, but to foster the growth of positive character.

Notice the principle that rational social progress demands wide inclusiveness. Many conceptions of the earthly life and of the final destiny of man are hopelessly one-sided. Some enthusiasts for general education, for example, advocate universal schooling to solve the world's ills. Some

economists apparently think that financial security of all persons will fulfil all the conditions for man's happiness. Some religionists seem to have the idea that the present world and life in it are valueless; they would have men neglect it as far as possible in order to seek for other-worldly goods. Scientists sometimes speak, in their zeal, as though the discoveries and inventions of science open to mankind the doors to all possible good.

The fact is that no rational creature can be satisfied with a one-sided restriction of his interests for a life time. However much a man may restrict his own activities, or be restricted by those who have authority over him, to the pursuit of any isolated set of values, power, pleasure, money, religious values, social values, the limitation will react upon him. If he does not actually lose the few things he prizes so excessively or to which he is restricted, his own mind, in so far as he is rational, will rebel at the monotony, the actual poverty, and the littleness of personality which such a course engenders. Rationality and goodness demand wholeness; to have good things one must be wholehearted, must devote his whole life, effort, and talent to secure them. A man must devote his whole attention in order to understand the myriad items which clamor to be seen and heard; and he must see the world whole in order to grasp its meaning.³ progress, then, may be de-

3. Cf. Hobhouse, RG, 121, 145.

defined anew as increase in the ability of minds to see the whole of anything; and social progress is the rational and benevolent will of men to include in their planning an increasing recognition of the interests of those who are separated from them by whatever boundaries--geographical, racial, political, cultural, or other.

The second of the principles which are conceived to be essential to a genuine social progress is that progress is effected only through individual persons. This is not to deny that there are mass movements of persons; there is a mob spirit, a group consciousness, a sense of mystical rapprochement, and an emotionalism which is evoked in many individuals at a time through contacts with other people. In the final analysis, however, any change in the group is an alteration of the persons who compose it. The locus of progress, as well as the real, is in the person.⁴

This thesis may easily be illustrated by a brief glance at the history of any science, art, or cultural pursuit which may be said to have progressed. The development that has occurred has been no abstract process, but a definite passing on of ideas from person to person, with a few especially fortunate or brilliant persons adding innovations and receiving most of the attention. Thus in the science of chemistry--after the beginning in alchemy a grand array of

4. Cf. Leighton, MC, 548; Hegel, POH, 38.

great names appears, men whose minds were the vehicles of progress for the science. Thus Boyle, Charles, Dalton, Priestley, Faraday, Davy, Lister, Mayer, Joule, Helmholtz, Mendeléef, and many others have made contributions and passed the science on more complete than they found it. In a similar manner social progress owes much to men like Buddha, Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Jesus, Locke, Mill, Kant, and Hegel, all of them men whose ideas have added to a fund of knowledge handed down from person to person, giving each person touched by it in each new generation a priceless heritage of truth, insight, and ideals.

The third principle, that individual persons need intelligent control and guidance, has here to do more with political affairs and government than with the control which each man exercises upon himself through his reason. That no individual conscience is enlightened enough to be absolute was the view of Hegel.⁵ A man must be guided by the systematic whole of things in order that both it and he may achieve the best possible.⁶ Since a good man may have poor judgment (and men of good will often suffer from this fault), the persuasions of power, emotion, authority, and reason must be used to protect the interests of the whole from the

5. Hegel, POH, 340; quoted in Leys, ESP, 300.

6. Cf. Hobhouse, RG, 204.

faulty partial judgments of individuals. The more rational persons recognize their shortcomings and submit to the corrective judgment of the whole social and political order to which they belong, even while trying to change that order into a more rational one as they see its faults, the more rapidly will social progress result. A man must submit to the good and rebel against the evil in his social order. Only so can he remain rational in the best sense of the word, and contribute the most to his fellow men.

3. Views of the prospects of social progress

i. Kant. Many of the views of thinkers on the prospects of social progress are none too optimistic. Kant, for example, said that "the distance separating the good which we ought to effect in ourselves from the evil whence we advance is infinite,"⁷ and no one can "hope that man's good will lead mankind to decide to work with unanimity towards this goal [a kingdom of virtue]".⁸ Kant does feel, however, that if a man possesses a good will "there remains a hope of a return to the good from which he has strayed."⁹ What is highly improbable, almost inconceivable for society, is within the limits of likelihood for the man of good will.

7. Kant, RWLRA, 60.

8. Ibid., 86.

9. Ibid., 39.

ii. Otto and Santayana. Otto and Santayana also impart a somewhat melancholy feeling about the prospects of society. The former remarks that few people who are optimistic about personal improvement have the same optimism about social progress.¹⁰ Santayana speaks drearily of "this immense distance from a rational social order"¹¹ and declares that "a truly rational morality, or social regimen, has never existed in the world and is hardly to be looked for."¹²

iii. Dewey. Still there are writers and thinkers who more hopefully call attention to man's endless perfectibility, his possibility of continuous advance. Even as these lines are written, a commercial advertisement in a prominent news magazine is almost wholly devoted to a statement from John Dewey on the question, "what kind of a world are we fighting to create?" Mr. Dewey speaks of the painful and slow arrival of the desired ends, but is convinced that "they will come surely, inevitably, if we keep our vision clear, and direct our energies into productive channels."¹³

iv. Plato. The formulation of utopian schemes has

10. Otto, TI, 237-238.

11. Santayana, LOR, 237.

12. Ibid., 239.

13. Dewey, art.(1942), 3. See also Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 245.

been the occupation of numerous great minds who were willing to admit that their schemes were impractical. For example, Plato did not discard his ideals even though he did recognize that they could not become an existent reality in a state.¹⁴ Leys says that "the construction of an ideal is necessary in order that a man may avoid a tempestuous and whimsical shifting of policy from moment to moment."¹⁵ The propensity of the human mind (irrational because out of harmony with the cosmic order, and logically, the confusion of contraries with contradictories) to want everything black or white, yea or nay, in Canopus or out, does not bring mind to the truth in seeking for social welfare any more quickly than in other pursuits. Leys warns of extremism:¹⁶

Because men are not perfectly rational, we cannot therefore infer that they are completely immoral and irrational. The fact that we are not angels does not prove that we are beasts.

4. Views of the good to be gained

and criticisms

Social progress was said above to be a mutual, increasing participation of men in common interests to create, to conserve, and to enjoy the things they want and need. As Rader points out, "human beings in great measure agree in

14. Leys, ESP, 161; see Plato, Rep., 472, 473a-d.

15. Leys, ESP, 161.

16. Ibid., 281.

what they do want."¹⁷ This gives a basis for a definite beginning. Yet men want a variety of things, some of which conflict, and there is difficulty in deciding which wants shall be given preference--all the more when many persons are to be considered.

Plato has well-expressed the popular idea concerning the most important value in these words:¹⁸

The rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.

Long ago, however, and through the years since, men who were able to evaluate fairly the worth of a life of pleasure, decided that as an end-in-itself which should supplant other values or goods, it was wanting. Plato himself refused to consider pleasure as more than incidental. Instead, he showed that a rational balance of wisdom, courage and moderation was far more to be preferred. These goods were conducive to the best individual life as well as contributory to the most desirable social structure. Pleasure as an end-in-itself chokes out the incentive to realize other goods and values. It is only one aspect of the good, and not the good itself.

In the minds of ethicists and social philosophers the concept of the good life has ordinarily been one in which

17. Rader, NC, 74.

18. Plato, Phaedo, 65a.

reason and good will must function; yet many of the viewpoints developed are partial and incomplete. For example, Bertrand Russell says that "the good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."¹⁹ "The good life must be lived in a good society, and is not fully possible otherwise," he insists.²⁰ But the world for him is devoid of purpose and meaning, is indifferent to man's ideals, and in the end it will nullify his achievements, for there is no personal immortality.²¹ Russell regards the customary morality as mostly irrational, and dissents from most of it.²² His conception of the good life is weakened by the notion of cosmic indifference to it; in practice men require the support of strongly intrenched metaphysical beliefs in order to keep a motive for love and a reason for accepting the guidance of knowledge instead of emotion or desire. One may want the whole truth as a sort of general end, but unless it bears a relation to his other values established by his metaphysical thinking, it cannot serve effectively through all the moral strains and stresses to which every man is subjected. If any knowledge is worth having, it must be because it can conceivably make life fuller and richer in some respect. Even truth is interrelated with other val-

19. Russell, WIB, 28.

20. Ibid., 69.

21. Ibid., 21.

22. Ibid., 58-62.

ues, and is not wholly intrinsic. If one knows that the world favors a rational way of life and antagonizes an irrational way, then the world cannot be indifferent to either way. On the contrary, if one is sure that the world does not support a rational way of life, no plan that he makes can be better than any other. Such a world could only convince a man of the futility of belief in anything. That Russell does not wholeheartedly accept the notion of the futility of life is evidenced by his emphasis on "courage and rational reflection" as the way to overcome fear.²³

Another view which is often in danger of being interpreted in a too narrow and partial manner is that called variously self-realization, perfectionism, or humanism.²⁴ It numbers among its proponents such men as Plato and Aristotle, and numerous modern idealists.²⁵ The basis of it is the fact that conscious minds are active, that they have potentialities for change in the direction of either good or evil, and that in their development they progress faster by contacts with other minds. Whatever the self may be in its essential nature, one of its powers is self-transcendence, through which means it grows and develops.

There are dangers in this viewpoint, among which is the one which concerns the particular self that is to be re-

23. Russell, WIB, 21.

24. Wheelwright, CIE, 189ff., 196ff.

25. Bradley, ES, 228-229; Green, PTE, 305, 308.

alized. The problem takes on with the individual person the same difficulties with which social ethics is occupied: which partial self and which individual person shall be favored? It is possible to distinguish the past, present, and future selves, the rational and emotional selves, the whole self, and others.

One might say immediately that the rational self should be given the right-of-way; yet unless he understood rational to mean widely-inclusive, as well as coherent, self-consistent, and purposive, there would be many goods which he would miss. Hobhouse propounds a view of self-realization which seems adequate. He says:²⁶

No person's good is definitely fixed till the whole is considered. . . .Self-development, as such, does not, in short, remain part of the social ideal. Rather all personal development is good as long as it is capable of harmony, the wider the sphere of development the greater the good attained.

The view of Bradley also has much to commend it. He says that the good moral life is found in the realization of the self as good-will.²⁷ Good-will is the primary principle of social harmony.

The good, then, is not a single simple fact--it is the harmony of values and goods in an individual personality or in a society, as well as a rational expansion and growth in which the individual and his social order develop together

26. Hobhouse, RG, 147.

27. Bradley, ES, 228-229.

and mutually benefit. A good society is one in which progress is being made--in which all values and goods that can be made coherent at all in relation to the whole are being realized. It is a society whose members (the majority of them) strive to live peacefully, wisely, creatively; to grow in wisdom and to distribute their benefits as widely as possible. This is in part what is meant by being civilized. Civilization which is more than a name calls for a widening circle of relationships with things and people, and may be thought by some on this account to make civilized men meddlesome in the affairs of other people.

On this last thought Otto presents an interesting notion of what the benevolence of civilized races towards uncivilized races involves. When one speaks of goods beyond the basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing, of commodities and goods instrumental to the more complete enjoyment of life and the development of selfhood, he must wonder whether foisting these upon people who have no desire for them is presumptuous and unjust. Is it justifiable in the interests of social progress to try to make the Chinese a nation of automobile owners or users of kerosene lamps in order to sell them oil and other western products? Should western culture be imposed upon them whether they like it or not? In regard to distributing these products to so-called uncivilized nations, Otto asks:²⁸

28. Otto, TI, 39-40.

Is it not a fact that we are supposed to be endeavoring to make them the needs of more and more, and that in so far as we succeed we call it progress?

Here again reason must be the chief critic. The whole situation, which includes the end, must be examined along with the means. Progress does require the creation of a demand for new goods, the awakening of new wants and needs. However, a great difference is apparent between the selfish, capitalistic procedure of creating a demand for tobacco or opium, with profit as the end in view, and the effort to awaken the interest of people in ways to better their earthly lot and find happier means of existence. The former procedure may be carried out in complete negligence of all personal values involved, whereas the latter is designed to operate reciprocally for the creation of personal benefits. In any case, members of primitive societies or of any society left in isolation usually are and remain indifferent to the happiness of other persons, except perhaps, a few close relatives. A rational society will seek to cultivate and promote friendly relationships of all kinds with mutual interests as the end aimed at.

5. The problem of social control

From the beginning of man's social life the fundamental problem which he has had to face is that of control, and until it is solved no rational progress can be possible. The aims of government, the scope of control, the means by which the control of government is executed, the principles

upon which it is based--these largely decide the fate of a social group. The rationality of a society is reflected in its government. Abject submission and practical slavery is progress-defeating, and the government which demands it is irrational. On the other hand excess freedom and lawlessness are self-defeating, chaotic, and equally as irrational. Social progress comes by viewing the government and the governed as a whole; and with the end of furthering the interests of the good and the real, good government will relax requirements or exercise more rigid control as these interests may be best served. Any form of government might be modified to work toward these ends, but a whole view calls for the kind of government which will protect itself against all kinds of deterioration--moral spiritual, economic, or any other.

Types of governments which have the greatest vogue at the present time, and between which the issues are most clear, are totalitarianism and democracy. These may be examined with the view of discovering the merits of emphasis upon the good of the individual or of the state. If the benefits to the individual are stressed, will those which should accrue to the state take care of themselves? If the state is powerful, prosperous, and carefully organized, will the individual person in it automatically find his needs supplied?

i. Contrast of totalitarianism and democracy. In almost every point of importance totalitarian and democratic forms of government are antithetical. Contrast on the following points may indicate this fact: (1) The totalitarian emphasis upon the value of the whole state is opposed by the democratic emphasis upon the worth of the individual--organicism versus atomism. (2) Totalitarianism operates upon the theory of complete control and regimentation within the state by only one political party, while democracy permits the free expression of opinion by those of widely varying political views. (3) The totalitarian states glorify traditions to a greater extent than does democracy, and they stress the unity of the past, present, and future to a much higher degree.²⁹ (4) Totalitarianism calls for less use of reason and for more deference to intuitions, feelings, "instincts of the blood." It prefers to develop men of action rather than men who think.³⁰ (5) Modern totalitarianism has a record of encouraging wars, the use of violence and force, with the idea that men grow heroic in the battle and clash of enemies.³¹ Democracy holds the ideal of peace with the use of a minimum of force. (6) Totalitarianism reduces values to facts, and in morals

29. Cf. Rocco, in Wagner, SR, 651-652.

30. See Spengler, DOTW, II, 17; quoted in Rader, NC, 51.

31. Rader, NC, 152.

and ethics adheres to a pure relativism. Good, better, valuable are terms of arbitrary meaning which ordinary individuals are unqualified and unprivileged to judge. Objectivity is a false ideal; truth must give way before the advance of the state. The leader must make decisions, and he does not err. The philosophers of totalitarianism deny the universality of law and all goods, and follow bias, racial distinction, national cultism, and class distinction.³²

ii. National socialism. The system of national socialism in Germany affords one of the best examples of the operation of a totalitarian regime. Two characterizations of it, written by independent observers, one early in the history of the movement and one recently, judge the character of the state very similarly.³³

The universities of Germany, once the strongholds of research and intellectual freedom, have been swept by a new theory of knowledge which justifies all the outrages of the Nazi student organizations and automatically eliminates all that has hitherto been known as either thought or science. According to this theory there are no objective criteria of truth. Truth is arrived at by feeling, specifically, by the feeling of uncontaminated Germans. Reason is to be "strictly in the service" of these Germanic intuitions.

The second of these articles describes the same condition of irrational procedure and the effect upon the observer.³⁴

32. Rader, NC, 337.

33. Lewinsohn, art.(1933), 277.

34. Agar, art.(1942),565; quoting Hamilton Fish Armstrong with approval, but without reference data.

There is a strange German world of mystification where, if we are able to enter at all, we find ourselves groping and bemused. . . . Since things have no clear intellectual basis they can have no issue except reckless and violent action or dreams of action that result from frustration and end in perversion and self-abasement.

In the description of such an order rests its condemnation for men who are rational in the sense defined above.³⁵ This is not to say that the German National Socialist State is wholly irrational. It is vastly unreasonable, but it has a certain set of values for which it employs very effective means to realize, and in this effort has maintained a remarkable inner order and harmony. Merely to call the Nazi doctrines nonsense as has been so often done, does not dispose of them. "It would be ridiculous to infer that they lack sense or intellectual subtlety."³⁶

However, the Nazi order does violate flagrantly some of the principles of rationality, and specific instances can be profitably examined. First, then, is the principle of consistency. For example, Hitler professes to despise Jews for their lack of culture, their lying, their racial exclusiveness,³⁷ and their cunning.³⁸ Yet Hitler has at various times extolled at least racial exclusiveness and cunning for the German people, and has made no apology for lying when it

35. See above, pages 4-17.

36. Kolnai, WAW, 57; cf. 18.

37. Hitler, MK, 414-18, 420, 430, 434, 437.

38. Ibid., 425.

suited his purpose. He has declared that the state cannot be "founded only on the classes which represent intellect and intelligence"³⁹ for it seems that too much culture makes a weak state. He has also said, "we will pursue no other ultimate aim than to win freedom for our German people and to secure a living-space for the German family."⁴⁰

But the story is so familiar now as to need no repetition. In the second place, the Nazis are irrational in being fanatical and extreme. Hitler said, "extremes must be fought by extremes."⁴¹ Their distinctions are absolute. Haider's separation of the "free born" and the "unfree"⁴² is a case in point; and the sharp distinction between the German and the foreigner or enemy,⁴³ between the pure and the impure races, between complete devotion to the state or treason, illustrate the intense, burning fanaticism of the Nazis.⁴⁴ "And if others speak of the World and Humanity we say the Fatherland--and only the Fatherland!"⁴⁵

In the third place the Nazis are subjectivistic and arbitrary. Their selection of values is based upon feeling,

39. Hitler, MNO, 171.

40. Ibid., 946.

41. Ibid., 46.

42. Kolnai, WAW, 382.

43. Ibid., 436 ff., 459-461.

44. Ibid., 129.

45. Hitler, MNO, 46.

and the self-stimulated consciousness of superiority of both race and nation.⁴⁶ Goering has said, "as for me, I am subjective, I commit myself to my people and acknowledge nothing else on earth."⁴⁷ The justification for one strong nation using force on weaker nations round about is that it is fun, and that it is nature's way, like a hawk slaying a dove.⁴⁸ "Youth is always right, because it sees things in an unspoilt manner, without inner check," says Goebbels.⁴⁹ A person without inner checks is likely to be extremely arbitrary in his actions.

Fourth, the Nazis reject the principle of widest inclusiveness. The efforts they put forth for improvement are nationalistic--for Germans alone.⁵⁰ Enemies are necessary for national growth, and the Jew makes a good scapegoat.⁵¹ If there were no Jews, other enemies would have to be found; attention must be directed to the fact that inferiors are enemies. There is no "goal of mankind."⁵²

Finally, German National Socialism is a revolt against the kind of reason which produces so-called civilization.

46. Hitler, MNO, 50; Kolnai, WAW, 194-195, 397.

47. Kolnai, WAW, 30; see MNO, 923.

48. Kolnai, WAW, 473.

49. Ibid., 296.

50. Ibid., 352.

51. Ibid., 502 ff.

52. Ibid., 397, 407.

Hitler has said: "In my eyes criticism in itself is not an important function in life. The world can live without critics, it cannot live without workmen."⁵³ This revolt against reason, however, is not so much⁵⁴

hostility to intellectual capacity as such; the persecution is directed against "reason" not as a power of thought, but as an organ of spiritual objectivity lifting individual man above the mental coercion of the tribe, above the identification of "truth" with the ideological trend of the particular group and its rulers. Reason is persecuted as the general bond of the spiritual unit of humanity, as the guarantee of union in place of domination, local oligarchy and tribal self-exaltation, as the hall-mark of a free community.

The Nazis deny to the capacity of reason the universality and objectivity which make it rational.

The strength of totalitarianism rests in its organization, unification, and its control of all factors related to the welfare of the state as a whole. Although individuals are subordinated to the state and considered only as instruments, they enjoy a fairly high degree of economic security, and the sense of having a part in a great enterprise.

On the other hand, the lack of freedom of expression, and the strict regimentation of persons makes for the destruction of the only really intrinsic goods there are. A progressive and successful state must deal in realities, for this is the only way to be rational; nature, it has been said, favors the rational and tends to expel the irrational.⁵⁵

53. Hitler, MNO, 283.

54. Kolnai, WAW, 58.

55. Lotze, MIC, I, 429.

Therefore, any state which ignores the good that lies in individual persons rests upon shaky foundations.

iii. Estimate of the principles of democracy. Democracy seems to come nearer to the rational acknowledgment of the good of personality than any other type of government in operation today. To be sure, it is not the last word in progressive government. "Democracy requires rethinking in relation to the changing world."⁵⁶ It has many defects and may acquire still more. It is loosely constructed, tolerant of evils which may destroy it, often lawless and uncontrolled to the point of anarchy and chaos, and inclined to permit competitions within its borders which blight its best features. "It is entirely wrong," says Julian Huxley, "to equate democracy with a system of free individual enterprise."⁵⁷ Such an uncontrolled process operates neither for the best interests of the individual nor the group.

Such "free individual enterprise," however, has been all too common in the democracies, and has been the source of numerous injustices and inequalities, especially in England up to about 1830 and in America from the Civil War until the present.⁵⁸ It is the economic heritage from an era which could not know from experience the incipient evils of

56. Huxley, art.(1942), 344.

57. Loc. cit.

58. See Leighton, SPC, 206.

uncontrolled competition. The present generation has thus inherited the system of profit-taking, the concentration of wealth in the hands of an aristocracy, and the concentration of poverty among the ranks of those who have only their labor to sell in order to earn a livelihood. Such economic upheavals as that of 1929, and the hardships of the succeeding years must convince anyone that something is wrong. Especially since war prosperity has appeared the question is being asked, if it is possible to bring prosperity by such concentrated and unified efforts in war time, why not in peace time also, and with ten thousand fold more beneficent results?⁵⁹ It is safe to say that the laissez-faire doctrine is definitely in the discard for the present generation, perhaps for the duration of the civilization that now exists.

In place of the older atomistic, individualistic order must arise a new one of economic planning where the principle of freedom within rational limits may be exercised. The rank inequalities, exploitation of the laboring man and other men, and the affront and harm to human personality must be eliminated. The progress already made is encouraging, but it is only the beginning. It is hindered by the excesses which arise from the newly distributed powers and privileges, and there is much correction and criticism that is necessary in order not to become unbalanced in the opposite direction

59. Huxley, art.(1942), 337-347.

in the process of gaining a stable economic and social equilibrium.

Three sound principles of democracy may be noted here: (1) The emphasis upon the dignity of individual persons; (2) The conviction that truth is a fundamental good; (3) The belief that permanency is a good which can best be engendered by pacifistic and conservative policies of government.

The autonomy of the individual person is the outstanding principle of democracy.⁶⁰

The yardstick by which we can measure democratic achievement is the satisfaction of the needs of human individuals, and the yardstick by which we can measure democratic method is their active and voluntary participation in all kinds of activities.

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Every human born into the world has in the eyes of true democracy a certain individual birthright--a birthright of health, strength, intelligence, varied enjoyment, and free interest.

Democracy recognizes the values and goods in the pursuits of men at peace far more than it does the values and goods of militarism. Good will and good persons are not usually products which come out of a continuous atmosphere of hatred, bloodshed, and strife. War is an abnormal phenomenon in which the individual person is necessarily swallowed up in the exigencies of the emergency. Only in peaceful pursuits is there "liberty and justice for all." In war

60. Huxley, art.(1942), 344.

there is necessarily injustice for some, privilege for others.

The love of democracy for truth has been shown by its maintenance of free schools, free press, free speech, by its tolerance of a variety of political doctrines and factions within the organization. Only the demand and need for order limit this devotion to freedom and truth. Diverse points of view are the result of free expression, and give each person his chance to be heard, but no one individual is the yardstick for the whole system. The person "cannot develop fully or freely except in an organized society."⁶¹ Hence some particular freedoms must be limited for the sake of all individuals together.

Whether democracy can endure through the severest trials of its strength that it has yet experienced remains to be seen,⁶² but probably no one thinks that it ought to endure in the exact patterns of the present. If social progress is to take place (whether in the framework of democracy or any other), the principles marked out above⁶³ must be followed. These are: (1) All governments and peoples must be recognized, tolerated, and familiarized with the aims and ideals of personality growth, and with the demo-

61. Huxley, art.(1942), 345.

62. Can it rise to internationalism as the U.S. rose to nationalism after the Civil War?

63. This chapter, page 145. Here in revised form.

cratic way of life. (2) All citizens, both of democratic and nondemocratic nations, must be educated, cultivated, benefited by every possible means--particularly must everyone be shown how to develop his own character, capacities, or life as a whole, and how to be of service to as many other persons as possible. (3) The governing power must work for a minimum of suppression of individuals and a maximum of individual self-control. No gains are made unless the burden of the execution of laws becomes lighter, or at least increases less rapidly than the proportionate population growth and the complexity of the social structure.

6. Modes of achieving rational democratic ends

How shall these ends be achieved? What is the reasonable way to proceed? It is not within the scope of this study to do more than to indicate what is rational and good and some general rational means for its realization in society. The means requires the control of the power by which social process operates. That power is first of all individual wills. Therefore the best kind of control is in the ideals which individual persons can be persuaded to acknowledge, with the resulting self-control. Good will must be the objective of education; not only technical and factual knowledge and skills must be taught, but also the appreciation of goods and values; not only learning but wisdom; not only science but philosophy and religion. To create ration-

al wills is the necessary beginning for all agencies interested in promoting social progress. "The coherent will alone is concretely good. It is the source of the goodness of objects or things."⁶⁴ "The only thing that is intrinsically intelligible. . . is a will oriented towards values."⁶⁵

Good will may be fostered by overt action among men as well as in the cultivation of one's own inner life. Racial or class superiority, for example, must not only be frowned upon, but the actual practice of treating all men as equals must be followed. The practices of unfair competition in trade, of taking advantage of the ignorance or weakness of others must not only be prohibited by law, but must receive the condemnation of public opinion and of personal judgment. Each man of good will is obligated to work in its behalf, for otherwise he cannot possess good will; he cannot be rational and fail to promote that which he believes good, for goodness and rationality are inseparable.⁶⁶

i. Ways of securing co-operation. If good will is to increase among men, some rational means of securing co-operation must be employed. The possible ways may be reduced to five: trickery, barter, emotional persuasion, rational persuasion, and force.⁶⁷ The first resort of govern-

64. Paton, GW, 180.

65. Urban, IW, 210.

66. See Chapter Three.

67. Wheelwright, CIE, 293.

ments has not usually been the best of these, namely, rational persuasion. From the beginning the most commonly used means of securing co-operation has been that advocated by the sophist Thrasymachus. "Justice," said he, "is the interest of the stronger," implying that might is right.⁶⁸

None of these methods should be condemned a priori. The rational basis of judgment is to include the recognition of the end in the judgment of the best means. Trickery is not always an irrational means. It is certainly justifiable in situations where the achievement of a good end is a practical certainty for those tricked, and when it is an end which they would (at their best) recognize as desirable. The use of force is almost the only rational procedure in dealing with a madman. A rational good may require that any or all of these means should be employed. No end justifies the use of arbitrary, ill-considered means, but any worthy end calls for rational means which may be discovered by a wise and thoughtful mind.

ii. Special value of rational persuasion. In general, it is more rational to reason with a person than to use force to gain an end, because in the long run (which is a factor in rational outlooks) such persuasion helps to develop an inner discipline and control that force would destroy. When a man perceives reasons clearly and acts upon them, his action has a greater value than any action done from compul-

68. Plato, Rep., Bk. I, 338a, b; cf. Rader, NC, 99.

sion. Thus rational persuasion, while initially more difficult because of the strain it puts upon the patience of the persuader, is really more of an economy of effort in the long run than force. Rational persuasion, in the main, is advantageous both upon scientific and philosophic principles: it employs the principle of parsimony and it views the ends and means as a whole.

Yet both rational and emotional persuasion must be based upon fact in order to be effective; and the fact that self-interest is the predominant motive that governs most human action must be taken into account. Hobbes and Bentham among others, have assumed it to be a primary ethical principle. It appears as a paradox, but also as a remarkable hope for progress, that it is possible for self-interest and social progress to develop concomitantly--that the good of society is also the good of the individual. The task of those interested in better things is to demonstrate to as many persons as possible this truth.

iii. Training in value-appreciation. Social progress depends upon a deeper understanding of the world than sense-experience alone yields. In other words, there is a need for not only scientific, but metaphysical, moral, and religious approaches to reality as well. A wholeness of viewpoint is necessary for man to develop into the best he is capable of. Few scientists as such attain to such a synoptic view, simply because of their primary interest in des-

cription. A descriptive and factual survey of the physical world misses important truth. Other facts are present but are neglected.⁶⁹

How can we reconstruct society unless we have first determined the goods, the values or ends, which we ought to seek? And how can we determine the meanings of good and value without a reasoned inquiry into the nature, value and destiny of human personality and its place in the universe? I hold that even imperfect religion is a much surer guide to social reconstruction than a crassly positivistic and utilitarian social polity, based on pseudo-scientific sociological generalizations.

The task before this generation is tremendous and full of challenge. It is one that has rewards, and will have more of them, for social progress is being realized on the whole, in spite of the setbacks it has received. The men to promote it are the present chief lack and need. As Mr. Dewey has recently written:⁷⁰

The mechanical means have already been produced by science and invention. Physically, the world is now one and interdependent. Only human beings--interested that men everywhere have a society of peace, of security, of opportunity, of growth in co-operation--can assure its being made morally one.

7. Summary of the chapter

In this final chapter the good individual life was taken to be one in which the good will predominates, in which purposes are coherent, and in which knowledge is the guide. Social progress was taken to mean an increase of

69. Leighton, MC, 547.

70. Dewey, art.(1942), 3.

participation by more and more men in common interests, to create, to conserve, and to enjoy together the things they want and need. Three principles are considered necessary, and must be observed if such progress is to take place: (1) Unity in variety, the wide inclusion of experienced facts with continuous harmonization taking place; (2) Development of the rational good through and in individual persons; (3) The persuasive, forward-looking control by intelligence, first and ideally self-control, but secondly and necessarily, in view of finite limitations, the control of government.

In governmental control, democracy comes nearer to the ideals set forth here than the other most typical form of government of today--totalitarianism. This can be determined by an impartial analysis of avowed aims and actual operation in specific nations. The saving factor of democracy is its benevolent conception of the worth of individual persons, and its care for them. Its present prototypes are unlikely to endure, but its basic principles must endure if society is to develop toward the ideal of the rational good. As basic needs are satisfied, as increased voluntary participation in all human activities is achieved, with more and more persons taking part in government, religion, education, business, industry, and the rest, society presents more variety with greater possibilities for the work of unification by reason.

The good society on these lines is a civilized soci-

ety--one in which good will prevails, where the majority of the people live by the rules, individual persons being as fully self-controlled as possible, but always under discipline. The good society allows the individual the greatest freedom consistent with order and harmony, and makes provision for social progress through individual growth. In the good society, intelligent choices of the necessary means of persuasion will be made, but the employment of rational persuasion will predominate.

8. Some final thoughts

The rational good may be thought of on three levels; these are the theoretical, the practical, and the ideal. On the theoretical level, the thought which is grounded in reasons, which finds its support in explanation and comprehension is rational good. Whatever system of ideas is intelligible, means something, is self-consistent, coheres, and is most satisfying to the reasoner's mind, is rational; and whatever is rational is in some sense good. Thus a philosophical system satisfies a need by its display of interconnection, and a mathematical system gives pleasure in the contemplation of its rigor, symmetry, and regularity. The human mind derives pleasure from order. Coherence is a good, and on the theoretical plane the only good.

On the practical plane, the rational good consists of results obtained by particular persons in the application of reason to problems of experience. It consists of

the development of virtues in reaction with the world of persons and things, the vanquishing of evils. Thus the virtue of persistence is built up by contact with an honest person, and other virtues in like manner ad infinitum. No person can enter into any relationship with other persons or things without undergoing some kind of modification. The rational good on the practical plane is the actual outcome, in a person or a society of persons, of greater integration, self-consistence, more inclusive ends. The rational good must not be merely understood, but realized.

No finite person is ideally rational, either in theory or practice. The statement may be made practically a priori, for it seems contradictory to think of a finite person who could not hold ideals, or an infinite person who could. Complete knowledge of possible goods, with a will constantly oriented to achieve them or conserve them seems to be the highest ideal of rationality and goodness. So much most people can agree upon. But without the conception of capacity or power the idea of will is meaningless; in fact will is very often referred to as "will-power." A powerless will is worthless on the practical plane--how little value then, must it have on the ideal plane! It is a remarkable fact that through the will, the rational self is able to exercise self-control, a prominent characteristic of the good will. But self-control is, just as much as any exercise of the will is, the power to carry out a plan of action. Hence

in the ideal realm, God is conceived as limiting himself as well as energizing and controlling the world. On the ideal plane, rationality is something akin to what it is upon the other two levels, but in their idealizing, human beings must concede that perfection so far outreaches their utmost grasp that description beggars the actual circumstance. Still the attempt must be made, and successive approximations (wider inclusions) come progressively nearer the end desired--human development. They do not come nearer to exhausting the infinite, but that is never the goal of any rational being. The ideal plane is not merely speculative, but is a viewpoint of synthesis and wholeness in which the theoretical and the practical find stimulation to work for the greatest benefit of the individual and of society.

Men tend to put a high value upon the immediate. It is easy to be satisfied with the practical goods which can be gained with a minimum of effort. The values of good will are not always immediately evident, and they require considerable work and patience to put into practice. The development of good will in oneself and society sets a man's task for a lifetime and is ordinarily not the successful outcome of a few years spent in his youth to attain it. Persons who call themselves practical often fall short of genuine practicality, because their lack of a long-run viewpoint brings them into chaos after an initial brilliant effort. All men need the guidance of the theoretical reason and of

the ideal ends that are available.

It is precisely these ends or levels to which more and more men must be brought in order to produce a social advance. All persons are capable of enjoying the insights of these levels, but few are willing to exert their intellects to attain them. The average man in the present order also lacks the time necessary to pursue the reasons for things to their origins. Yet he needs the poise, the balance, the comprehension of the meaning of life which such a background of systematic knowledge supplies. He needs the guidance and control of ideals which can be gained only at the cost of effort and time. As society encourages the expending of effort and provides more leisure time for these pursuits, both it and the individual will benefit together in this widening, deepening, and lifting process.

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ABSTRACT

The central problem of this dissertation arises out of a conflict between the emphasis on irrational or nonrational values, on the one hand, and the emphasis on the rationality of good on the other. The philosophy of those who follow immediate and uncriticized preferences, their unreflective common sense and prejudices, is inevitably opposed to that of any who are devoted to the ideals of truth and reason. Advocacy of the rationality of good encounters two main objections: that the rational good is impossible to realize, and that it is undesirable when compared with good as otherwise conceived.

Some of the objections tend to disappear when the rational good is defined. In the minds of many the word 'rational' has unpleasant associations with the abstract and the formal. However, the term 'rational' is conceived to mean more than any merely abstract or formal thought. Something in addition to the usual connotation of formal consistency is needed, and this extra meaning is found in the notion of a coherent ideal end which includes the widest possible scope of experience, of fact, of objective reference. Defined in this way, 'rational' means that which is coherently, purposively, concretely, and ideally whole.

The term 'good' also needs definition. It does not mean whatever a person happens to like; this defines value. Neither is the good an ideal of the Platonic kind, as often conceived, out of meaningful connection with the workaday

world. The good is the ought-to-be-liked (true value), an ideal which is relevant to the actual. If it were irrelevant to the actual, it could not be a principle having necessary application, or requiredness, or oughtness. Good differs from value in just this quality; it compels rational assent even when it is not immediately liked. In comparing and contrasting the good and the ideal it may be said that all goods presuppose ideals, but not all ideals are good. Everything which ought to be liked is an ideal in so far as it is a concept of a not-yet-appreciated, not-yet-realized fact or event which ought to be appreciated and realized. Ideals are of various grades or levels, and no one could say that those which are impossible to make actual in any degree ought to be universally striven for. Whatever ideals a man acknowledges prescribe the good for him, and this prescription contains an imperative which he must heed if he would be rational.

A search for clues to the nature of the rational good leads to the examination of the philosophic systems and basic attitudes of those who oppose it. Natural sciences abstract from and therefore ignore the whole concept of good, except the good of knowledge. Naturalistic philosophy, although often concerned with moral good and allowing it, denies the whole concept of good any objective reference, except for the good of knowledge. Authoritarianism, pessimism, transvaluationism, mysticism, and factualism assume

partial, subjective, or otherwise inadequate positions of opposition to the rational good. These views are defective in the metaphysical picture which they portray.

Rationality and goodness are inseparably connected. Desire for the true good creates an obligation to be rational. Irrationality, in so far as it is inconsistent, is always self-defeating; furthermore, it is self-defeating even when consistent, if reason is subordinated to the status of a mere instrument. To be rational means to aim at the good. To aim at nothing, and to spend all one's time in criticizing means while neglecting ends are equally irrational procedures.

The connection between the rational and the good may be variously approached. Bergson has done much to call attention to the complementary relationship between intellect and intuition, and to show that neither alone is adequate for the tasks which the whole mind must perform. A wholly rational good, therefore, is one which acknowledges intuition as a recognizer of values, but which also acknowledges reason as critic and establisher of relations. The compulsion, requiredness, or obligatory quality of true values is a reaction of the whole mind to them.

Kant demonstrated the connection between the rational and the good by reference to the requirements of the pure reason and the moral ought. Every rational person feels obligation, but he also feels that fairness and justice require

appropriate rewards for fulfilled obligations. In a world of free agents this is impossible unless there should be a central co-ordinator who has both the wisdom, the will, and the power to dispense justice. Thus the situation (the interrelation of pure reason and empirical fact) demands that such an efficient agent be postulated--an agent in whom goodness and rationality are united.

Just as the good and the rational are connected, so the rational good and the real are connected. Reality is defined as any fact or event which has objective reference and can be thought about coherently. It does not contradict itself and it has the capacity to endure. Good is fully capable of conforming to this standard when it is conceived as inhering in personality, or as the good will. Negatively, it is difficult to see how anything can have value or be good except as it comes under the form in which it is intelligible to minds; in short, unless it is related to minds. Indeed, value means appreciation or enjoyment by a mind.

The chief argument for the objectivity of good, or more exactly, for its identification with the real as personal, is the element of purpose which is present wherever anything is conceived as good. On the whole the world acts so as to promote the rational and to expel or discourage the irrational. It seems to be aiming at an end, for its changes are, as a rule, orderly and consistent.

Further, in history, whenever important decisions had to be made, individual men have often made better decisions than they knew. That which was not the conscious design of any single human mind cannot be called the operation of mere finite intelligence (as Bosanquet suggests).

Purpose is the basic element in personality. If the real is purposeful, it would seem to be also mental and personal. The good, the rational, and the real are three distinct concepts, but they coalesce and find their unity in personality. Personality is the only realizer of value, and is the supreme good. The rational good is realized as persons develop more sympathetic attitudes, sensitive perceptions, good will, and coherent, self-consistent, widely-inclusive thinking. God, the Supreme Person, works for the realization of these ends in more and more persons, and is the guarantor that man's efforts shall not be in vain.

While the rational good is an end achieved in human individuals, it cannot come to full realization unless individuals achieve it co-operatively. Wider inclusion is a goal for social order as well as for the individual mind. A current ideal is a world-community. All forms of political organization which adhere to short-sighted, limited ends defeat the rational end of continuous progress of all nations; a progress which is the realization of the capacities for good in every concrete human personality.

Conclusions:

1. The rational good is differentiated by the fact that

it involves an 'ought' grounded in the coherent relationship of ends and means, and in the endlessness of the task of reason.

2. Opposition to the rational good comes chiefly from those who take positions with less complete perspective than the rational good affords. Unless reason itself be repudiated, the opposition may make a contribution to the more inclusive view.

3. The ideal of the rational good is apprehended jointly by intuition and the discursive reason. Each is complementary to the other, and each alone tends to fall into error, which can be corrected only by the joint operation of both.

4. The ideal of the rational good is concretely realized and exemplified in persons, who are loci of all values. In abstraction from personality value and good are without meaning.

5. The reality of the rational good requires the enduring validity of the ideal, its presence in the divine mind, its operation in the world of things, and its capacity to foster harmony among persons.

6. Social progress consists of the realization of the ideal of the rational good in increasing numbers of individual persons, and in a more compact, efficient social structure.

7. Forms of political organization have significance for social progress. Most forms have the defect that while

they aim at the best possible good, the actual good attained is limited to too few persons, thus violating the rational principle of widest possible inclusiveness.

8. Whatever means are employed to secure social and political co-operation, reason prompted by a good will ought to determine where, when, and how they are to be employed.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH



Delbert R. Gish, son of John E. and Grace Palmer Gish, was born in Adams County, Nebraska, February 5, 1906. He graduated from the Hastings, Nebraska, Senior High School in 1924 and attended Hastings College one semester. After having married Carol Kathleen Spell in 1927, he served as pastor of the McPherson, Kansas, Church of the Nazarene, from 1927 to 1929. In the latter year he returned to school, and received the A.B. degree from Bethany-Peniel College in 1932. Two years later he was graduated from Oklahoma University with the degree of Master of Arts. Since 1932, with the exception of two and one-half years leave of absence granted for the purpose of study at Boston University, he has been professor of philosophy at Bethany-Peniel College.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY



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